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The Dollar and the Policy Mix; 1985
ABSTRACT
In19T1, Robert Mundell proposed a stunning solution to the three problems
then affecting the U.S. econonr: high inflation and unemployment, and a weak
currency. Mundell suggested that the policy mix of fiscal expansion and mone-
tary contraction could work to raise output, reduce inflation, and strengthen
the currency at the same time. This policy mix has been pursued under the
Reagan administration since 1981. The paper investigates the contributions of
this policy mix to disinflation and output growth. It finds that the policy mix
has contributed as much as three percentage points of the reduction in inflation
during l981_8I, but that the gains against inflation due to the mix will likely





Cambridge, MA 02138THE DOLLAR AND THE POLICY MIX: 1985
In 1971, Robert Mundell proposed a stunning solution to the three
problems then affecting the United States economy: high inflation and
unemployment (by the standards of 1971!), and a weak currency. His essay
"The Dollar and the Policy Mix: 1971", from which I borrow my own title,
called for a policy of fiscal expansion and monetary contraction. Mundell
argued that this policy mix, which has more recently been derided as driving
with one foot on the brakes and one on the gas, is able to extract the
comparative advantage of the two instruments. In Mundell's view (formalized
in his famous "assignment problem" for policy instruments), fiscal policy
has a comparatively larger effect on output than on prices, compared with
monetary policy. Therefore, fiscal policy should be "assigned" to the
output target, and monetary policy should be assigned to the price level
target. Ostensibly, the policy mix of fiscal expansion and monetary
contraction can work to raise output and cut prices (or at least slow
inflation) at the same time. And both sides of the mix, asserted Mundell,
would act to strengthen the currency, by raising interest rates and drawing
in foreign capital. In 1971, it should be remembered, the dollar was tied
to other currencies through fixed exchange rates and was under strong
downward pressure, which eventually forced a devaluation in mid—year.
Perhaps the most surprising assertion of the 1971 essay at the time was the
notion that fiscal expansion could strengthen the currency. After all, the—2--.
rates was a fiscal contraction, not expansion. Mundeli's own earlier work had
turnedthisidea upside down, at least as a short—run proposition. In his
famous essay "The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for Internal and
External Stability" (1962), Mundell pointed out that in a world of high capital
mobility, a fiscal expansion would raise home interest rates, and pull in more
than enough capital at the initial exchange rate to finance the current account
deficit caused by the fiscal expansion.3 Under fixed exchange rates the central
bank would gain foreign reserves, while under flexihie rates the currency would
appreciate. In Mundell's ndel, the traditional argument that fiscal expansion
weakens the currency in the short—run is correct only if at least one of the
following conditions holds: either there is low international capital mobility
or the fiscal expansion is money financed (in thich case the currency tends to
weaken even with high capital mDbility). Of course, Mundell's argument that
fiscal expansion would strengthen the currency has become commonplace in the
UnitedStates in the policy debate of the past two years. It is still regarded
as dubious, however, by most European economists when applied to the effects of
fiscal expansion in their own economies.
Mundell's policy advice was not pursued in 1911 or 1912, since the Fed
embarkedonone of the n-cst agressively expansionary policy episodes in its
history. In the event the dollar was battered, losing 19% in value relative
to a basketof currencies between July 1911 and March l9T3.' Inthe last
fouryears, however, Mundell's experiment has been tried, and with a
strongerdose of fiscal expansion cum monetary restraint than he himself
probably envisioned. Since 1981, the Reagan Administration has pursued a—3—
course of large budget deficits, while the Federal Reserve Board has maintained
apath ofgenerally declining money growth rates. The macroeconomic results
have in many ways been in accord with Mundell's analysis: a sharp rise in the
dollar, apparently caused by a capital inflow attracted to high U.S. interest
rates; a sharp drop in inflation; and an average rate of growth during l98l_81,
composed of a sharp recession in 1982, followed by a vigorous recovery. A major
side effect of the policy mix has been the worsening of the U.S. trade and
current account positions, with both measures of external deficits reaching a
proportion of GNP unprecedented in this century for the United States.
This paper asks the following question: Has the macroeconomic
performance since 1981 vindicated the Mundell—Reagan mix of fiscal expansion
cum nDnetary contraction? And if so, what then are the implication for the
appropriate path of budget deficit reductions and rnetary policy in the
comingyears? The n.jor question to be asked iswhether the policy mix has
reducedthe"sacrifice ratio", measured as the amount of GNP losses incurred in
order to reduce the inflation that the Reagan administration inherited in 1981.
To answer this question, I will look at the disinflation to date, as well as the
future prospects for inflation (especially in view of the likelihood of a dollar
depreciation).
My own analysis of the policy mix will stress the differential effects of
monetary and fiscal policy on the value of the dollar, and thus on iurported
inflation. It is important to note, though, that there are many others reasons
wby monetary and fiscal policies might have different effects on inflation and
output that would justify the use of a particularpolicy mix. Mundell,in fact,— it—
hadadditional mechanisms in mind in 1911, some in line with today's supply—
siders. He suggests that tax cuts stimulate output and reduce prices by
increasingaggregate supply relative to aggregate demand. (He also argues that
money is, at best, neutral with respect to output except in the veryshortrun;
at worst, a money expansion may be contractionary, Mundell argued, because of
non—neutralities in the tax system.) Thus the mechanism that I will stress is
based more on Mundell vintage 1962 than Mundell vintage 1911. There are other
mechanisms as well, ignored henceforth, that might argue in favor of the
Mundellian assignment of fiscal expansion cum monetary contraction in the pro-
cess of disinflation.5 All of the arguments in favor of a particular mix for
disinflation stand in contrast to the textbook case in which output levels and
past inflation alone determine current inflation. In those models, any mix of
monetary and fiscal policy that yields a given output level also has the same
inflationary consequences. Tobinhas labelled such nDdels as "funnel models,"
sincethe macro policies are funneled into output without any direct or
differential effects on prices.
In view of the stress on exchange rates, the following questions are
examined:
(1) Has the strong dollar contributed to the disinflation, taking as
given the overall level of GNP or unemployment in the econoirr, and if so,
by a quantitatively important amount?
(2) Can the policy mix plausibly explain the movements in the value
of the currency?
(3) Do expected future nvements in the value of the dollar (to—wit,—5—
a large real depreciation to reverse the appreciation of the past four
years) threaten to undo the benefits so far achieved via a strong dollar?
(li) In view of expected future movements in value of the dollar,
does the policy mix viewed from beginning to "end" (i.e. if and when the
dollarfalls) makesense as an anti—inflationary strategy?
(5) Are theside—effects onthe U.S. economy of the strong dollar (e.g.
thesqueeze on tradeables, the rise in U.S.foreign indebtedness) too
costlyto justify the choice of policy mix?
(6)AreU.S. gains from the policy mix balanced by losses in the rest
oftheworld, so that the policiesare infact beggar—thy—neighbor?
Questions(3) and (n),aboutthe longer—term aspects of the policy mix, are
especially important in view of the fact that Mundell's arguments were based on
short—runmodels that do not make allowance for the long—term effects of current
accountdeficits andbudget deficits. Notably, Mundell's canonical model of
fiscal expansion under flexible rates allows for an "equilibrium" in which a
countryhas an appreciated exchange rate and a current account deficit forever.
More recent de1s have shown that when the short—run effects of fiscal poiicy
include a currency appreciation, the long—term effects typically involve
depreciation.6 The weaker long—run value of the currency helps to generate a
trade account surplus that is used, in the long run,to service the external
debtaccumulated in the period of currency appreciation. Given that the
benefitsof the strongdollar may be lost over time, does the strategy make
sense when viewed over a reasonably long time horizon?
To be clear about purposes, one disclaimer should be made at the—6—
outset.Though I will analyze the U.S. policy mix from the point of view of
dynamicpolicyoptimization, I do not want to pretend that the mix has been
designed primarily (or at all) with the exchange rate arguments in mind.
Indeed, the notion of inexpensive disinflation through currency appreciation
was rarely, if ever, explicitly stated in 1931 as an argument on behalf of the
Reagan tax cuts (though more recently the President has explicitly defended the
strongdollar on these grounds). Supply—side advocates often rejected the
demand—stimulus arguments that formthebasis of manyofmy later results.
Myown viewof the "design" of the policy mix is more Darwinian. Tax—cut
advocates didexplicitly endorse the argument that a debt—financed fiscal
expansion need not be inflationary, but they probably did not anticipate the
enormous currency appreciation, and its anti—inflationary benefits, that would
follow from the policy. However, once the non—inflationary recovery got
underway, the short—term success of the policy mix became evident, and the
pressure to expand money or to contract the budget deficits was eliminated.
Even if the policymakers fell on to a desirable path accidently, the staying
power of the strater has resulted, at least, from the short—term (if not
long—term) benefits that it is yielding.
The p'ain result of the paper is that the Mundell policy—mix reduces the
sacrifice ratio in the short run, but increases it in the long run. In the
U.S., the exchange appreciation has reduced U.S. inflation ly as much as three
percentage points as of l984. Given the strong likelihood of a depreciation of
the dollar, those inflation gains will.likely be lost, or more than lost, in the
future. Because of the foreign debt that the U.S. economy will accumulate in—T —
comingyears, the eventual decline of the dollar, in realterms, will likely
exceedtheappreciation since 1980. As I discuss later, the welfare calculus
suggests that choosing a low sacrifice ratiointhe short—termfora higher
long—run sacrifice ratio makes sense when there is a perceived need for a rapid
reduction of a high initial inflation, i.e. when inflation has rapidly rising
marginal social costs.
The paperisorganized in four sections. In the first, the pattern of'
dollarappreciation is examined, and some estimates of its disinflationary
consequencesare made.In the second section, the prospects for future
movementsIn the doflar are studied, asare projections offutureinflationary
consequences from dollar depreciation. In the third section, a medium—scale
structuralmodel isused to assess the linkages between movements ofthe
dollarand theunderlying policy mix. In thatsection,I examine the
arguments for andagainstthe Mundellian strate,r fromthepoint of view of
dynamicpolicy optimization, first from thenarrow U.S.pointof view, and then
fromworldecononr as a whole. In the fourth section, some of the risks in the
current situation are studied, particularly appropriate policy response to a
sharp depreciation of the dollar.
The Value of the Dollar and the Disinflation Process
Figure1andTable1 document the remarkable movements in the value of
thedollar in the past eight years. Tointerpret the data, note the following




1911:1 1980:14 1911:1 1980:14
Effective Rate 314.14 50.0 28.8 378a
Countries
— Canada 32.9ll.4 16.0 1.5
— France 87.8 111.8 50.0 51.8
— Germany 26.8 59.7 51.3 50.2
— Italy ll4.2 ioR.6 329a 1429a
— Japan —16.2 16.8 12.6 29.3
— UnitedKingdom 35.8 96.2 38a585a
a198)4:3 is the period of comparison.
Source: All data are from the IFS. The data are averages for the quarter. The
effective nominal rate is the MERE index. The effective real rate is
the I'W measure of relative wholesale prices. The real bilateral rate
is PE/P*, where P, P are WPI in the U.S. and abroad, E is units of



































































































































dollaris measuredinterms of the number of units of foreign currency that it
purchases (a rise in the index therefore indicates appreciation). "Effective"
rates indicate dollar values relative to a basket of currencies. "Real" exchange
rates are nominal rates multiplied by a U.S. price index and divided by a
comparable effective foreign price index. The real exchange rate may be thought
of as the price of U.S. goods relative to foreign goods, with both expressed in
acoimnon currency. Arise in U.S.relativeprices is termed a real
appreciationofthe dollar. As can be seen, the nominal effective exchange rate
appreciated by about 31t percent from 1917:1tol984:4, and by 50percent from
l980:Ito l98)4:4, using the IMF'sMERM—weightedeffective exchange rate for the
U.S. dollar. The last quarter of 1980 will bethestarting point for most of
the analysis, since it marks the coming to power of the Reagan Administration,
and the beginning of the Mundelliari policy shift. In real terms, the
appreciation has been as dramatic, with increases during l980:4—84:3 of about 38
percentwhen measured by wholesale prices, 148percentthen measured by relative
unit labor costs, and 39percentwhen measured by relative consumer price
indexes. (There has been another 10—15 percent real appreciation through April
1985, but the IMFindicesare not yet available after l984:3.) Table 1 also
shows the changes relative to the major currencies. Note the sharp real
appreciation relative to European currencies and the smaller appreciation
relative to the Japanese Yen. In fact, the Yen itself has appreciated relative
to a basket of currencies since l980:4, a point that is sometimes ignored in
assertions that the Japanese authorities have unfairly caused a Yen
depreciation.—9—
Theupward movement in the dollar began almost precisely upon Reagan's
election victory in November 1980. Later, I will argue that the fiscal
expansion since 1981 (and anticipated after November 1980) has been a major
factor in the currency- appreciation. As is documented in the
Blanchard—Suimners BPEA1984:2stur of world real interest rates, the fiscal
expansion in the U.S.hasbeen accompanied t a fiscal contraction in other OECD
economies. In the period since l980:4,theUnited States andtheother six
largeOECD economies have had a major success in reducing inflation, but the
United States is the only country in the group to have reduced inflation and
tohave achieved a vigorous recovery from the 1982 recession. In the European
countries, the inflation reduction has been accompanied by a protracted and
serious rise in unemployment. The evidence suggests that the extent of
recovery (or the change in unemployment since 1982) has beenrelatedto the
extent of fiscal expansion. Of course other factors, such as the flexibility
in labor nE.rtet adjustment has also probably played a role in the
differential employment adjustment in the 1980s.
Without question, a significant part of the U.S. disinflation can be
attributed to the sharp recession during 1981:3 to l982:i According to
Gordon's estimates in the BPEA 198)4:2, the currulative GNP gap (output loss
relative to potential) during the recession was 9.9 percent of GNP. Since
the end of the recession, the economy- has remained significantly below
Gordon's estinEtes in the BPEA 198)4:2, the cumulative GNP gap (output loss
relative to potential) during the recession was 9.9 percent of GNP. Since
the end of the recession, the economy has remained significantly below—10—
potential, with another 10.5 percent of cumulative GNP gap between 1982:3
and l98b:4. TJsing these estimates, we can make a rough measure of the
sacrifice rato in the recent disinflation. The inflation measure used is
the personal consumption deflator of the national income accounts. The
pre—Reagan inflation rate will he taken as the quarterly change in 1980:14 (at an
annual rate), specifically 9.6 percent. The current inflation rate is taken as
the quarterly rate for l984:14, to wit, 2.14 percent. The cumulative gap is taken
from Gordon's estimates of potential GNP, and is measured for 198 1:1 to 19814:4
to be 21.5 percent of output. The sacrifice ratio is the cumulative gap divided
by the slowdown in inflation, or 21.51(9.6 —2.4),which equals 3.0. A
similar measure is found if the slowdown in inflation is calculated using the
inflation rates of the entire years 1980 (10.2 percent) and 19814, (3.2 percent),
and the same 21.5 percent cumulative output loss.
I-low does a sacrifice ratio of 3.0 compare with estimates that were made
before and during the disinflation of the past four rears? As Fischer has
recently summarized, the range of estimates of the ratio were surveyed by Okun
in l9T8, and were found to be in the range of 6 to i8.T Okun himself put the
best guess at 10. On this basis, the outcome to date has been significantly
better than forecasted. Note that this conclusion is not changed if we try to
measure the slowdown using a "core" rate of inflation, rather than a measure of
actual inflation. Using the change in average hourly earnings in non—fara
business (comparing 19814:4 with 1980:4), for example, we find an even larger
slowdown in inflation, and therefore a lower sacrifice ratio, equal to 2.9.
One reason that the sacrifice ratio, using the GNP gap, has been lower than— ii.-
forecasted is that the relationship between the GNP gap and aggregate
unemployment has apparently shifted since 1980 (i.e. the coefficient in Okun's
law has changed). The cumulative "excess" unemployment since 1980:4 (using 6
percent as the t'ull-eiuployment level) has been 10.8 years, which is more than
pre—1930 Okun's Law equations would have associated with the 21.5 percent output
gap during the period since 1980:4.8 An unemployment—based sacrifice ratio
therefore yields 1.7, which is below butcloseto the band of 2 to 6 that Okun
surveyed in 1978. Thus, on one measure —theoutput gap ——thedisinflation
has been much more rapid than considered plausible in 1978, while on another
measure——theunemployment rate —thesacrifice ratio has been just below the
lowend of the suggested range.
There are of course a large number of possible reasons for the favorable
disinflation of the past four years. Rational expectations theory stresses
thatsacrifice ratios notbe stable, and indeed n.ydepend on the policy
regime.Perhaps Voicker's non—accomodative policies generated a new found
credibilityfor the Fed, along the lines urged by Cagan and Feliner in BPEA
1983:4.In Perry's terns, the wagenormny have shifted in a favorable
direction,because of' Reagan'sresolveinfiring PATCO workers, or his
apparentwillingness to countenance a deep recession in 1982, or other
reasons. I believe, however, that much of the reasons is more prosaic, and
notso optimistic for the long run. Specifically,the strongdollar has
played a major role in the disinflation process. Gordon showed in his 1982
BPEA paper that allowing for international influences on the U.S. price
dynamics (exchange rate effects,foreign price effects, food and oil prices)—12—
reduces the estimated sacrifice ratio for the GNP gap frori about 8.5to3,
equal to the recent experience. In the vector autoregressions in that study,
Gordon estimated the exchange rate appreciation effects to be the natural
consequence of tight monetary policies, and thereby foresaw the relatively low
cost to the recent disinflation. (His estimates do not, however, very
accurately capture the long ran depreciation of the dollar that maynow ensue.
Thus, while his estimates were accurate for the short term, they may prove too
optimistic over the longer ran, as discussed later.)
Howplausible is it to assume that the strong dollar has played a major
role in the disinflation process? What is the best guess of its
quantitativesignificance to date? To answer these questions, I consider
three types of evidence: first, the existing range of estimates regarding
the effects of exchange rate changes on prices; second, estimates of the
structural channels through which the exchange rate can influence prices; and
third, a simulation model of theworld economy, with a major block for the
U.S.in which the general equilibrium effects of U.S. exchange rate changes
canbe considered.
Exchange Rates and Inflation in the TJnited States:
Existing Evidence
In a very useful paper written in 1919, Hooper and Lowrey surveyed the
literature on the effects of a dollar depreciation on U.S. prices.9In most
ofthestudies that they examine, a small model ofwageand pricedynamics
is estimated, with wage and price inflation a function of output or—13—
unemployment,lagged inflation, changes in the exchange rate,andforeign
prices. In some of the models, the dollar price of oil is held fixed when
the depreciation is simulated, while in others, the dollar price of oil is
modelled endogenously, and is therefore affected by exchange rate changes.
In most cases, the studies investigate how wages and prices are affected by
an exogenous change in the exchange rate,takingas given the path of output
and the local currency prices of manufacturing imports (e.g. the DM price of
Gernn exports, the Yen price of Japanese exports, etc.) This is a useful
framework for this paper, since we will want to see how inflation is
affectedby a changein policy mix that altersthe exchange rate but does
not changeoutput. It has thelimitation, however, that by taking as given
local currency prices in the restof the OECD, itignores the linkages fromthe
U.S. exchange rate to local currency prices abroad and backto U.Simport
prices. This is a factor that can be accounted for only in a globalmodel,as
presented later. In the partialequilibriumexercises that Hooper and Lowrey
analyzeitis also cmcial to assume that whatever are the shocks altering the
exchangerate(e.g.portfolioshifts, change in mixof fiscal and monetary
policy, etc.), these trefundamental changes have no direct effect on prices
except as they- work through output or the exchange rate itself.
The study reaches the following conclusion:
The consensus estimate we propose .. .isa given 10 percent
real dollar depreciation, on a multilaterally weighted
average basis, will result ina1—1/2percentincrease in
consumer price level, assuming a (fixed GNP targeti ifoil
importpricesare not affected bythedepreciation; and it
willresult in al—3/4percent increase if the oil import
prices rise by the same proportion as nonoil prices in
responseto the depreciation. given the timeframeof the
various tmDdels considered, about half ofthetotal impactis—1)4—
likely totake place within one year of the depreciation and
theremainder within two to three years, although the timing
ofthe oil price effects maybemore variable because of the
discontinuity of OPEC pricing decisions. (pp. 51—52)
In some of the studies, the price level effect of about 1—1/2 percent in
fact represents the two— or three—year effect, with greater effects present
if a longer time interval is examined. This is true when the level change
in the exchange rate gets built into a persistent change in inflation rate.
Note that persistent (even permanent) effects on inflation arelogically
possibleafter a one—time level depreciation, since the policy authorities
are assumed to beholding real GNP fixed, and are therefore assumed in the
experiment to be fully accommodating anyincreases in the domestic price
level.
The estimates then are that the inflationrate is about .8 or .9
percentage points higher in each of the first two years after a 10 percent
depreciation (and equivalently, about .8 or .9 percentage points lower in
each year after a 10 percent appreciation), and perhaps somewhat higher in
later years as well. For purposes of illustration here, let us assume that
theinflation rate is .3 percentage points higher in the third year, and
zero thereafter. Given the Hooper—Lowrey estimate of 1—31)4 points on the
CPI, divided evenly in the first two years, with a third—year effect of 0.3
added on, how important has the strong dollar been for inflation in the
periodsince 1980, taking thepath of output as given? Using the same data
as in Figure 1, the effective nominal exchange rate appreciated 12.7 percent
in 1981, 11.7 percent in 1982, 5.8percentin 1983, and 7.9percentin 198)4.—15—
Applying the Hooper—Lowrey consensus (with the assumed third—year effect) we
find the following estimates of inflation with and without the appreciation
since 1980:
198119821983 198)4
Actual Inflation 8.'?' 5.9 3.7 3.2
Exchange Rate Effect 1.1 2.1 1.9 1.6
Inflation with fixed 9,8 8.0 5.6 )4.8
Exchange Rate since
1980
Thus, a substantial effect of the exchange rate is indicated, though by no
means has the appreciation been the decisive factor, according to these
estimates. My own estimates, later on, will show a larger effect, basically
because I find that the effect on inflation is more persistent than implied
here.
Several more recent estimates have been developed, that also imply a
significant role for the exchange rate in the recent disinflation. I have
already mentioned that in a 1982:1 BPEA study of Gordon and King, who consider
the costs of disinflation under two alternative assumptions: (1) that the tight
monetary policy underlying the disinflation causes the dollar to appreciate, and
thereby causes import prices and food and fuel prices to fall relative to
baseline; or (2) that the exchange rate, import prices, and food and fuel
prices, are unchanged by the path of disinflation. In the first case, the
authors estimate a sacrifice ratio of 3.0, i.e. 3 percent loss in output for
each one percentage point reduction in inflation. In the case where the foreign—16—
variablesare exogenous, the sacrifice ratio rises to 8.)4!Dornbuschand
Fischer (198J-) have recently offered some estimates of the role of the exchange
rate appreciation since 1980.10 Their study is novel in allowing for a direct
effect of exchange rate movements on wage settlements, above and beyond any
indirect effects via consumer prices or output. The argument is that a strong
dollar raises domestic labor costs relative to foreign labor costs, and thereby
increases the pressure on domestic firms in the tradeables sector to limit
costs. Sjnce thIs effect Is presumed to hold at a given level of total output
or employment, Dornbush and Fischer appear to be arguing that a weak
tradeables sector plus a strong non—tradeahies sector is less inflationary
than the reverse situation. They estimate that a 10% depreciation of the
dollar, at given aggregate output levels, causes a 2.1 percentage point effect
on prices over a two—year period. These estimates are higher than reported by
Hooper and Lowrey, perhaps because of the wage effect, though they might have
been higher still, since lJornbusch and Fischer do not allow for arr effect of
exchange rate changes on the rate of change of oil and gas prices.
Finally, there are estimates from large—scale econometric idels, such
as LINK or the Federal Reserve Board's Multi—Country Model (MCM).Recent
simulationson the MCM yield much smaller estimates of the effects of the
exchangerate appreciation. Note that the numbers shown below are for fourth
quarter over fourth quarter inflation rates:
198119821983
Exchange Rate Effect 0.6 1.11.2
(From P. Hooper, "The Macroeconomic Effects of Exchange Rate Changes: Some
Quantitative Estimates", Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
April198)4)—17—
StructuralEstimates of' Exchange Bate Effects on Inflation
Inow turn to nrjrownstructural estimates of the role of the dollar
appreciation.There are several possible channels through which exchange rate
changes may affect domestic wage and price formation. Most simply, at unchanged
foreign currency costs of production, an exchange rate change should affect
the domestic currency price of foreign imports. (I will term this the "direct"
effect). In turn, changes in foreign import prices will affect consumer prices
directly if the imports are consumer goods, or indirectly if the imports are
inputs into production of consumer goods. As many analysts have noted, however,
a change in exchange rates (for given levels of foreign wages and prices) may be
used by foreign producers to expand profit margins on sales to the U.S. (in
which case import prices in dollars do not change), instead of being used to cut
prices in dollar terms (which preserves an unchanged markup over foreign costs).
In general, a change in the exchange rate appears to cause a less than
proportional change in import prices in the short run, as foreign producers
react to the exchange rate change both by lowering prices and expanding their
markup over local currency costs.
A second possible channel of effect comes as domestic producers react to
lower import prices by cutting their own prices and profit margins. Even at
unchanged domestic costs, domestic producers may cut prices (and be forced, by
reduced profit margins, to Lthdraw output supply), in view of lower
competitors' prices. If this effect is important, the size of the exchange rate
effect on consumer prices will be given not by the direct weight of imports in
the price index, but by the weight of all highly tradeable goods (including—18—
imports,exports, and import-competing home goods) in the price index. I term
this channel the "competitiveness" effect.
There are at least two areas where the competitiveness effect surely
applies.The impact of changes inworld oil prices on the CPI is far higher
thanis indicated by the share of oil imports in consumption expenditure,
sincedomestic producers must adjust their prices to shifts in world prices.
Asthe U.S. produces roughly half of its petroleum consumption, the impact of
changes in the worldprice of oil on the CPI might be roughly twice as large
asthe import share. A second area where the effect applies is in food.
TheCPI weight of food is of course far higher than the importcomponent
alone,since the U.S. produces the great bulk of its food consumption. Since
world market prices will importantly affect domestic food prices, a given
exchange rate change might show up in consumer prices with a far larger impact
than the direct import share of food would predict. I stress below, moreover,
that even though oil and many foods in international trade are priced in
dollars, exchange rate changes should still be expected to have a large effect
on dollar prices of those commodities. Where the competitiveness effect is
harder to observe is in the area of manufactured goods. Woo has recently argued
in BPEA l981:2 that for inanu'actured goods, competitiveness effects are small,
if not negligible. Others too have found small, though significant,
competitiveness effects for U.S. nianufacturing.ll
The "direct" and "competitiveness" effects will have a large impact on
inflationonly ifchanges in the CPI subsequently get built into wage
drnamics.Merchandise imports are only about 9percentof GNP, and are probably—19—
about the same direct share intheCPI (including the pass—through of
imported intermediate product prices into final output). Even if we increase
this weight through competitive effects in food, fuel, and other goods enough to
get a 15 percent weight of foreign prices in the CPI (a little larger than the
estimate below), a 1O% appreciation of the dollar would not have over.ihelining
inflation consequences, especially when spread out over several years. Suppose
that each 1% appreciation results in a 0.75% drop in import prices (i our
estimates below). Then a 40 %appreciation,spread out over four years, causes
import price inflation to be about (40/4x .15) 7.5 percentage points higher
per year. With a CPI weight of .15, the inflation effect of the appreciation
would be about 1.1 percentage points per year. Since the overall reduction in
inflation has been about 7 percentage points by l984, the exchange rate role
would not have been large.
However, if the changes in the CPI get built into wage inflation, we
can dramatically increase the inflation effect imputed to the dollar
appreciation. Suppose, for example, that wage inflation =
w.
—wi
(with wt the logarithm of wages) is a function of lagged consumer price
inflation and lagged output:
(1) = +
where =p
—p1,and p is the (log) CPI. Suppose also that p is a
weighted average of wages and import prices p:
(2) =Xw+ (1—X)p
(i—A might reasonably be expected to be between 0.1 and 0.15). Combining
(i)and(2) we have:—20—
(3) = + ÷
(i-A)ir
where is the rate of import price inflation.
Consider a baseline path for ir,andask how that path will change
for a one—shot rise in importpriceinflation at t=0, denoted We examine
the path holding fixed the baseline for output q. If is the change in
inflation relative to the baseline path,wecan easily see from (4)that:
() C = (lX)XtMm
In every subsequent period inflation is higher, by an amount that decays
geometrically.Note that the total price level effect of the shockis
given by whichsimply equalsupon substitution of (5).In
otherwords, a 10percent fall in import prices eventually causes a
10 percent fall in domestic prices, even ifthe direct weight of m in c is
small.(This is assuming that macroeconomic policy offsets any effects on
output). The feedback from m to pc to w, and back topC multiplies the
directeffect of import prices severalfold.
In this way, a )40 percent appreciation can plausibly have had a very large
effecton U.S.inflation even though the economr has a relatively small import
share.Assuming that each 1 percent appreciation leads to a drop in import
prices of 0.75 percent within the year; and that the weight of tradeables in the
CPI is 0.15, the simple model just outlined delivers the following estimates of
theexchange rate effect since 1980 (using the annual rates of exchange rate
appreciationmentioned earlier):12—21—
1981 1982 1983 198)4
Exchange Rate Effect 1.4 2.5 2.8 3.3
In this case, more than three percentage points of the inflation reduction
since 1980 can be attributed to the rise in the dollar. The main difference
betweenthis estimate and the Hooper—Lowrey based estimate that I derived
earlier is the third— and fourth—year effects of the exchange rate change on
inflation. (Note that the first two years here are slightly higher.) Earlier,
I assumed a 0.3 percentage point effect inthe thirdyear following a 10 percent
appreciation;here, the effect is 0.T. Andthe fourth—year effect is 0.6.
Asa preliminaiy step toward a structural model, it is useful to examine
thecomposition of imports and consumption in the U.S. econony. The breakdown
of imports by- end—use is shown in Table 2. Merchandise imports in 198)4
accounted for 8.9 percent of GNP. Almost, one fifth of U.S. imports by value
were oil and another 18 percent were other primary or intermediate inputs to
industry. Food imports were 6.5 percent of the total. The remaining imports
were finished goods of various sorts. Taken together, importedinputs (food,
fuel, and otherindustrial supplies) accounted for )414 percent of total imports.
18 percent of imports werenon—automobile capital equipnnt for industry,
leaving only 18 percent of imports as non—auto consumer items. Automobile
imports accounted for 17 percent of the total. Of course, auto imports should
in principle be divided between consumer purchases and business purchases.
These data are illuminating for several reasons. First, the direct
effect of lower prices on imported consumer items (other than food, fuel, andTable 2: Composition of U.S. Imports, 1984
Percent of Total Percent of
Merchandise Imports Imports GNP
Primary and Intermediate:
Food, Feeds, Beverages 6.5 0.6
Fuels 19.1 1.7
Non-Food, Non-Fuel 18.4 1.6
Industrial Supplies
Finished:
Capital Goods (ex—auto) 18.4 1.6
Consumption Goods (ex—auto) 18.4 1.6
Automobiles, parts 16.9 1.5
Net Elsewhere Classified 2.4 0.2
Total 100.0% 8.9%
Source: Based on imports by end—use category, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business.—22—
autos)is bound to be small.Suchimportswerea mere 2.6percentof total
personal consumption expenditure in 19814. And with respect to autos, any
potential sizable gains in auto prices during 1981814 were likely prevented by
the voluntary export restraints on Japanese autos, as I document below.
Thus,to the extent that there are sizable "direct" effects of lower
import prices on consumption prices, these will show up in significant extent as
reduced costs of industrial inputs and as lower food and fuel prices. Contrary
tosimple models of international trade which emphasize only trade in final
consumption goods, U.S. trade is heavily skewed to primary and interaediate
commodities, or to capital goods. Indeed, 62 percent of imports were of these
categories in 198)4, and no less than 6Tpercentonaverage during 198O.814.
(Note that changes in capital goods prices should not be expected to have any
significanteffects on short—run pricing. There will bea long—ran effect, of
course,aschanges in capital goods prices will alter investment expenditures
and thereby change unit variable costs in the future.) The low share of
significant non—food, non—fuel consumer imports probably accounts for much of
Woo's findings in BFEA 198)4:2 of small effects on consur prices of non—food,
non—oil import prices.
There is little doubt that the exchange rate appreciation has affected
the prices of all categories of imports, except where trade barriers have
substantially insulated the domestic market from world price effects. The
price changes for a subset of the end—use categories are shown in Table 3, for
theperiod of dollar appreciation (1980:)4—198)4—)4) and a preceding period of
dollar depreciation (1976:)4—1980:)4).Duringthe period of depreciation theTable 3: Price Changes During Appreciation and Depreciation
(annual rates of change)
PERIOD OF PERIOD OF
ITEM DEPRECIATION APPRECIATION
(1976:4—1980:4) (1980:4—198)4:3)
Effective Exchange Rate —2.7' 10.6
Overall Import Price ii.6 —3.0
Deflator
Consumption Deflator 8.4 4.9
ImportCategories:
Food imports 12.1 —3.0
Fuel imports 27.14 _3.7
Non—food, non— 13.0 —2.8
fuel supplies for
Industry, imports










anot including autos bcommodities only c 77:3:80:14
Sources:Effective exchange rate: IMFMERM Index
OverallImportdeflator:NIPA
Overallconsumption deflator: NIPA
Consumer goods (overall), imports: Implicit price deflator, NIPA, not md.autos
Consumergoods (overall), CPI: consumer price index, all commodities
Food, fuel, non—food andnon—fuelindustrial supplies: Implicit price
deflators, NIPA, Table 7.17
Autos, imports: importpriceindex, BLS, SITC 781
CPI: consumer price index, urban, category 45
Apparel, imports: importpriceindex, BLS, SITC 814
CPI: consumer price index, urban, category 83200
(for both categories, footwear not included)
Furniture, imports: importpriceindex, BLS, SITC 82
CPI: consumer price index, urban, category 29
Appliances, imports: import price index, BLS,SITC775
CPI: consumer price index, wage earner, category 30—23—
import items rnse in price muchmorerapidlythandid domestic prices (as
measured by the consumption deflator), while the opposite is true after 1980:14.
There are two categories of consumer goods that were subject to extensive trade
restrictions in the early1980s:textiles (governed by the multi—fiber
agreement) and autos (governed by the voluntary export restraints on Japanese
autos). It is noteworthy that those categories of imports show little
difference in pricing with domestic goods, while unprotected consumer items,
such as furniture and appliances, had import price increases far below the
overall priceincreases for thosecategories in the CPI index.
Thebreakdown ofconsumption expenditure by category is shownin
Table ,togetherwith data for consumer price increases in some of those cate-
gories. A striking feature of the table is that nearly half of consumption
expenditure is on services rather than commodities. Since the services have a
high input of nontraded goods (particularly for housing services, which are
about 30 percent of total consumption expenditure, and about 60percentof total
services expenditure), we should expect asignificant exchange rate effect only
withinabout half of the consumption basket. It is notable, indeed, that infla-
tion in services significantly outpaced inflation incommoditiesduring
l98O:1_8)4:1,by 6.9 percentper year compared with 3.9percentper year. Fuel
prices, among the connuodities, increased particularly slowly during 1980:14814:14.
Consumerfood prices increased surprisingly rapidly in the period (3.6percent
onaverage)incontrastto the sharp drop in U.S. food import prices and (as we
shallsee) world prices ofprimaryfood products. Part of the discrepancy
results from the considerable processing of food that takes place between theTable 14:Composition of Consumption Expenditure
(Urban Consumers, December 1983 CPI weights)
Change in Price,
1980: )4—19814
All Items Weight (annual rate)
Commodities 52.5









Source: Weights show the relative importance of category in the All Urban
Consumer Price Index, December 1983.-2
farm and consumer level. As an example, part of the CPI food index includes
"food away from home", which includes a large service component, and as would be
expected, "food away from home" increased in price much more rapidly (5.2 per-
cent) than "food at home" (2.9 percent).
Among commodities, about half of expenditures are accounted for by food,
beverages, and energy alone! Indeed, food and energy expenditures account for
about 30 percent of the total consumption basket. (Note that about one half
of energy consumption is categorized as energy commodities and the remainder
as energy services.) Thus, food and fuel effects will surely constitute an
important share of exchange—rate effects on the cost of living. We have already
notedthat direct imports of non—food, non—fuel consumer goods are a rather
small proportion of the consumption basket. From the consumption data alone we
cannotdetermine much about the direct importance of non—food, non—fuel primary
conudities, which would play a role as inputs into the production of other
consumeritems.
Our framework for measuring "direct" and "competitiveness" effects is as
follows.We assume anaggregate production function for domestically produced
consumergoods, of the form Q= Q(L,R,E,F,K),where L, R, E, F, K are the
primary factor inputs:labor,raw materials (non—food, non—fuel), energy,
food,and capital respectively. The first four inputs are treatedas
variablein the short ran, while K is treated as pre—determined. Markup
pricing theory holds that the output price P should be a markup over standard
unit variable costs, with productivity measured at a normalized or standard
capacity level of output. In logs (using lower case variables), and ignoring
constants,—25—
(5) p =a(w—)+ +e
+ (++y+ =i)
with i= (log)standard output per manhour. With a variable markup, as
suggestedbycompetitive pricing, (5) is re—written with a term cq added on,
whereq log Q.
Toobtain consumer prices, pCweassume that Cisa weighted average of
p and importprices of non—food, non—fuel consumer goods, pm:
(6) Pc =p+(l_A)m
The role of mcomes through the two possible channels alreadydiscussed.
First, directpurchases of finished import goods byconsumersshould lead to a
weightof m equal to the weight of such goods in the consumption basket (about
2.5 percent). Second, domestic producers may reduce profit margins relative to
the normal markup implicit in (5),inorder to competewithforeignsuppliers.
Inthe end, the consumer price is written as:
(7) C =A(w—)+ Ar + 1e + f+
Extensive econometric experience with estimation of price equations has
shownthat the link of pC to the input prices may involve lags in adjustment.
To allow for such lags, equation (T)isestimated allowing for polynomial
distributed lags for the right—hand—side variables. In the notation below,
PDL(x,a,b) signifies a polynomial distributed lag on variable x, of order a, and
length b. No end—point constants are imposed in any of the estimates.
Equation (7)isestimated for the period l97O:l_l981:)4. Importantly,
eand p' are measuredby world indexes for primary inputs of enerr and food—26—
rather than as indices for consumption expenditure on enerr and food.13 As
already noted, €he consumption indices for energr and food already include a
greatdeal of processing of the raw materials. For this reason, we should
expect the weight on energy and food in the pequationto be far below the
apparentweight of food (.19) and energy (.11) in the overall consumption
bracket.
Two estimates of (7) are shown below. The first equation is an O]IJS
estimate, allowing for first—order serial correlation in the residual, without
imposing the condition that the coefficients sum to 1.0. In the second
equation the long—run condition is imposed (the estimates also correct for
serial correlation). The sum of the weights for R, E, F, and M is shown below
each equation. Observe that we proxy for the log of labor productivity, ,bya
time trend, and (time)2.
Estimated equations
Unconstrained version:
=0.78 + 1.08PDL(w,3,8) +0.OILPDL(p,3,6)
('.oi) (r.) (2.I2)
+ 0.01PDL (p,2,)4) +0.03PDL (p,3 6)
(1.4) (2.3)
+0.06PDL (p,3,6) —0.02time +.00008(time)2
(2.0) (6.7) (10.8)
=1.000 p =0.5 d.w.=2.0
Totaltradeables weight =0.14











=0.995 p= 0.83 d.w. +2.O1
Total tradeables weight =0.11
Note that the primary inputs plus foreign consumer prices represent a substan-
tial share of the consumption price, 0.14 percent in the first equation, and
0.11 percent in the second.
Our next step is to determine the effects of exchange rate movements on
the primary input prices, and imported final goods. When e (the logarithm
of the effective exchange rate, measured as units of foreign currency per
dollar) changes, how muchwillthe input prices move? This is a difficult
question, particularly- in view of the special features of the world markets for
food and energy. A good starting point, however, is to consider the effect on
the dollar price of a homogeneous commodity that trades freely, without
transportcostsor trade impediments in world markets. As an idealization,
consider the rawmaterial B to be such a good.
TheAppendix derives an equation for the (log) dollar price r under the—28—
assumptions that: (1) R is traded freely throughout the world, subject to the
law of one price; (2) the supply of R in each region is a positive function of
the local—currency price of B relative to the local—currency output price;
(3) demand for B is a negative function of the same relative price; and
()developingcountries outside of the OECD peg to a basket of OECD
currencies. The resulting equation has the form:
(8) dp'=dp+dYw
where dp is the percentage change in an index of dollar output prices in the
OECD, i.e., each country's local currency- output price is converted to dollars
at the prevailing exchange rate, and then weighted in an overall OECD basket;
dyW is the percentage change in weighted average of real incomes throughout the
world and dPr is the percentage change in dollar price of B. The U.S.
has a weight of y in the average, and the rest of the OECD has a weight of 1 —y.
In changeform,
(9) dp=dp+(i—)(dp0—de)
Note that from (8)and(9),atgiven levels of real activity- and given
domestic output prices in the U.S.(p)and the ROECD (p0), an appreciation of
the U.S. exchange rate causes dPr to decline by(1—i)de.
Theexpression foris quite intricate, though the following ruleof
thumb applies. The larger the U.S. is in the OECD (in the production and
consumption of B), the smaller is (1—y), i.e. the smaller is the exchange effect
on r. If the U.S. is perfectly small (see the Appendix for technical
conditions) dp'7de =—1.If the U.S. constitutes the entire world market for—29—
thecommodity, dp'7de 0.
Inseveral studies the IMF has estimated commodity price equations of the
form in (8),forcommodities including food, beverages, agricultural raw
materials,and metals.15The estimates for (i—y)centeraround 0.75,
suggesting that a one percent appreciation of the dollar leads to a fall in
commodity prices of 0.75 percent. Specifically, "the results indicate that an
appreciation of the U.S. dollar by 10percent in a given quarter vis—a—vis
other major currencies reducesthe unit values bysomewhat less than 1.5percent
duringthe same quarter, and byclose to 7.5percentwithin a year. "16
Itis interesting to note that when we use a weight for the U.S. of 0.25
in (9), as suggested by the IMF studies, we can account for much, though by no
means all of the decline since l980:IL in the real prices of primary inputs on
the basis of the U.S. exchange rate movements alone. First, I construct an
ROECD index of consumer prices, p°, using MERM weights for 17 non—U.S. econo-
mies. Then I compute the change in real input prices in terms of U.S. goods,
ROECI) goods, and the OECD basket including U.S. goods and ECDgoods, with
weights0.25 and 0.75 respectively. The decline in terms of U.S. goods is of
course always greater than the decline in terms of the OECD basket, the gap
being due to the U.S. real appreciation. About one half of the decline in real
commodity prices is due to the dollar appreciation, and the other half is due to
the fall in real commodity prices in terms of the overall OECD basket (see data
in the accompanying Table 5). Presumably the drop in real input prices
vis—a—vis the overall OECD basket is due to: continuing world recession,











Source: As defined in footnote 13. The real price in the U.S. is defined as
pl/pC for commodity i. The real price in the ROECD is defined as











have caused a reduction of primaly commodity inventories; and favorable supply
conditions for many agricultural commodities. (See the IMFWorldEconomic
Outlook,April 1985,fora detailed discussion of non—oil and oil price
developments and prospects).
A recent study at the U.S. Department of Agriculture of grain prices
reached conclusions similar to the IMF studies, though the USDA study indicates
several amendments to the model underlying (8) that must be made in the case of
grain trade.17 In the basic model, the USDA study found that a 10 percent
appreciation of the U.S. dollar should reduce grain prices as follows:
7.3 percent for wheat; 6.7 percent for corn; and 6.3 percent for soybeans (see
Table )-tofLongmire and Morey). These elasticities are based on the U.S.
consumption and production shares of the three grains and estimates of demand
and supply elasticities, as in the Appendix. The authors indicate, however,
that protectionist restrictions in food trade should be expected to lower the
transmissionof the exchange rate since effectively the U.S. becomes a larger
proportion of the relavant trading area. We have already noted that the larger
is the U.S. role for a commodity in demand and supply, the smaller is the
exchangerate effect. Accounting for these trade impediments in a rather
general way yielded the following lower price changes: —5.7' percent for wheat,
—5.9 percent for corn; and —5.9percentfor soybeans (Table 6 of Longnrtre and
Morey).
Last, there is the complicated issue of U.S.agriculturalprice supports,
and their interaction with the exchange rate effect. For some grains in some
periods during 1981—8)4, U.S. price supports put an effective floor on prices.—31--
Exchange rate appreciation in that case reduces the decline in dollar prices and
induces a rise in government stockpiling. Longmire and Morey model these
programsin a verygeneralway butdo not, unfortunately, analyze the recent
experiencewiththe price support programs. In their model, the support
programsgreatlyreduce the short—run price responsiveness for those grains at
the price floor, but not the longer—run responsiveness. Intheir interpretation
ofthe price support programs, the long—run effect of a 10 percent appreciation
on prices still exceeds —5.0 percent with the government programs continuously
applied (see Table 7 of the study).
A model such as (8) can also be used to account for OPEC oil pricing,
even though OPEC prices are set by cartel behavior rather perfect competition.
A full model of OPEC behavior would involve some form of dynamic optimization
of the large producers, taking account of the supply behavior of the
competitive fringe. OPECoil prices should then in general depend on a basket
ofOECD prices, as in (9), where the weights in that basket depend on oil
production andconsumptionshares of the various OECD economies and perhaps on
OPECconsumption shares of OECD conunodity exports. The U.S. share of oil
consumptionamong industrial economies is about 0.5and the share of
productionis about 0.75.18 On the other hand, the share of the U.S. in OPEC
purchases from the OECD is 18 percent.Assumingthat OPEC attempts to
stabilize the level of oil demand when e changes, the exchange rate effect
would be on the order of —0.5. Assuming instead that OPEC attempts to fix the
real price of oil in terms of its consumption basket of OECD goods, the
exchange rate effect should be as high as —0.82 (=i—.i8).The latter—32—
approximation seems closer to the mark.Asshown in Figure 2, real oil prices
in l98)4:L in terms of OECD goods are only )4percentbelow their 1980:)4 level,
when the U.S. has a weight of 0.18 in the OECD basket. In the U.S., real oil
prices (measured relative to the WPI)fellby 25 percent in the period, while
in the restofthe OECD oil prices rose by 3 percent relative to the WPI.
In the ndel below, I will use a single estimate, —0.75, for all three
primarycommodities. In solving the nodel, the equations for p", pf, e are
thenwritten as:
(10) p =+ [0.25p+(i—0.25)(p
—et)]
I =r,f,e
wherePC is measured as the U.S. consumption deflator, and pis an ROECD
weightedaverage consumer price index (MERM weights). pisthe historical
relative price ofthe input in termsofthe OECD basket. I treat shifts in as
exogenous to exchange rate movements. Note, as already mentioned, that the
choice of 0.75 implicitly attributes most, though not all, of the decline in
real input prices in the U.S. to exchange rate movements.
The next step is an equation for m, the (log) price of consumer goods
imported into the U.S. In some initial experiments, I attempted to model as
a weighted average of U.S. consumer prices and ROECD consumer prices. The U.S.
consumer prices never entered significantly into an equation explaining m•
Consistently, ROECD consumer prices entered solely and significantly into such
an equation. Thus, in the simulations below, I treat m as a function of a
distributed lag of the (dollar-equivalent) consumer price level of the ROECD.


















































= 0.99 p =0.9 d.w. =1.92
(17.9)
Rememberthat p° is the (log) MERM—weightCPI levelin the ROECD. According to
this equation, a 10 percent appreciation of the dollar translates into an 8.9
percentdecline in (non—auto) import pricesof consunr goods into the U.S.
Toclose the nr,del, I estimatea wage equation of standard form, relating
wage inflation to a distributed lag of price inflation, and to current and
laggedvalues of the Perry demographically weighted unemployment rate. The
estimated equation is:




= 0.75 p=0.19 d.w. =2.00
(1.6)
The entire modelcan be simulated for the exchange rate changes since 1980,
assumingthat the path of output and foreign currency prices are the same for
alternative paths of the exchange rate.19Themodel is solved in two versions,
using the unconstrained and constrained equations for the consumer price level.
As I have already noted, the unconstrained version of the model will show a
significantly larger exchange rate effect than the constrained version, since
the weight of tradeable goods is higher in the former case. As a first
exercise, we determine the passthrough of a ten percent currency appreciation
intolower inflation:—3 14_
Reduction in inflation (percentage points) Year 1 2 3 4
Unconstrained 0.7 1.0 0.9 1.0
Constrained 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.5
The model as a whole tracks quite well in a dynamic simulation
starting in 1976:1. Inthedynamicsimulation,the paths of output, the nominal
exchange, the real prices of primary inputs, and foreign currency consumer pri-
ces are taken as exogenous, so that the model effectively solves for the wage—
price dynamics, with nominal wages, consumer prices and primary input prices
changing endogenously over time. The simulation in the unconstrained case is
shown in Figure 3. Basically, the nodel misses about 1 percentage point of the
rise in inflation between 1979 and 1981, but is generally on track during
1981—84. For calendar years, the results are:
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 (3 quarters)
Actual 9.5 10.2 7.8 4.9 3.1 314
Predicted 9.1 9.6 7.9 14.7 3.0 3.8
Whenthe partial effects of the actual exchange rate changes are simulated
(by comparing a path of no nominal exchange rate changeafter 1980:14 with the
actualexchange rate path) we find:
Exchange Rate 1981 1982 1983 19814(3 quarters)
Effecton Reducing
Inflation:
Unconstrained 0.8 1.9 2.14 2.8
Constrained 0.6 1.5 1.7 1.9
To further examine the sensitivity of these results, we substitute a "Perry



























































the change in nominal wages is determined mostly by "norms" or rules of thumb,
rather than by inherited inflation or expected price inflation. In that spirit,
Ireplace the earlier wage equation with (wt —w14)
=0.3(p1
—p5),which
allowsfor a small (0.3) passthrough of lagged consumer price inflation into
wages. The resulting estimates for the inflation effect of the dollar
appreciation in the unconstrained case are:
1981 1982 1983 19814
Exchange Rate Effect
with Perry wage norm 0.7 1.5 1.14 1.1
Clearly, nr own high estimates of the inflation effect as of 19814 depend on a
significant effect of lagged prices on nominal wage change. In the Perry model,
the exchange rate effects are largely dissipated by 19814 (of course such a model
must resorttosome explanation for the downward shift in the wage norm after
1981.)
Consider,finally, a decomposition of the causes of the disinflation into
exchangerates, unemploynente, and favorable, exogenous "supply—price" shocks.
First,themodel is runfora constant nominal exchange rate after 1980:14, and
the difference of that path from the full dynamic simulation path with actual
exchangerate changes is the exchange rate component. Then, the model is run
with the unemployment rate held at the NAIRU level (the level is 6.1 percent for
the Perry unemployment rate in the estimated wage equations reported earlier) at
the historical exchange rates. The difference of that path from the original
simulationis the output gap component. Third, the model is run assuming no
fall in the real prices of primary inputs in terms of the OECD basket
(i.e. is fixed at its 1980:14 level). The effect of this assumption—36—
relativeto the baseline is termed the real—input price effect. The breakdown
of thedisinflation is as follows, for the unconstrained nodel:
198119821983198)4 (3 quarters)
Total slowdown 1.8 4.7 6.5 6.2
of which:
Exchange rate 0.8 1.9 2.4 2.8
Unemployment —0.2 1.6 3.9 3.4
Real InputPrice 0.9 1.9 1.5 1.4
Lagged inflation & 0.3—0.7—1.3—1.4
For the constrained version, the breakdownis:
1981 198219831984 (3 piarters)
Exchange rate 0.6 1.5 1.7 1.9
Unemployment —0.2 1.14 3.2 2.3
Real Input Price 0.5 1.4 1.2 0.8
Lagged inflation and 0.9 0.4 0.4 1.3
residuals
Thus, the range of estimates of the exchange rate effect is between 1.9
and2.8for 1984.In both versions of the model, the exchange rate effect is
slightly less than the unemployment effect.
Prospects for the DollarandU.S.Inflation
Ifthe real appreciation of the dollar could be attributed to a permanent
shift in underlying conditions (restoration of confidence, a safe haven effect,
etc.) then we could chalkup apermanent benefit in the disinflation process,
perhapsalmost 3 percentage points of inflation last year. The evidence is—31--
stronglyto the contrary however. In this section I show that the market's own
forecasts continue to predict large dollar depreciations in the coming decade.
These will have a significant effect on U.S. inflation.
In most interpretations of recent movements in the dollar, high U.S.
interest rates are a majorproximatecause. A standard story, based on
Dornbusch's overshooting model, goes as follows. Assets denominated in
different currencies are close substitutes in asset portfolios. Therefore,
theymust earn a nearly equal expected return when the returns areexpressed
ina common currency. Let in be the nominal yield (on an annual basis) of a
riskiessn—year asset denominated in dollars, and let ibe the nominal yield on
aforeign riskiess asset of the samematurity.With the spot exchange
rate, expressed as units of foreign currency per dollar, and tEt+ the
exchange rate expected to prevail in n years, the expected
dollar-denominated return of the foreign asset (on an annual basis) is
—1.20With perfect substitutability of home and
foreign assets (e.g. as would be implied by risk—neutral wealthholders, and
an absence of capital controls), home and foreign yields must be equalized.
Thus, we would have in equal to this quantity, or:
1/n (ii) (1-i-i) =(E/E+) (l+i*)
In one simple model, that is not too bad empirically, the real exchange
rate in the long run is presumed to be fixed at a given constant level though it
might deviate from that level in the short run because of the slowness of prices
to adjust to long—run equilibrium levels. Let H be the fixed long—run value of—38—
(P/EP*),and Rt be its current value. Suppose also that (by whatever
equilibrating mechanisms) the market expects Rt to return to R within a period
of n years (it may expect an even quicker return to B).
Now, let us define as the average annual inflation rate expected
over the n—year interval so that P =(i+ii )flpand p*=(l+.ff*)rlP*. tt+n n t tt+n nt
Also, define the n—year real interest rates at home and abroad as:
(l+r) =(l+i)(Pt/tPt÷)l and (1+r*) =(l+i*)(P/tP+)Vn.By these





(13)(a) (et+p_p) =logR +n(r_r*)
(b)e = + logB +n(r_r*)
According to (12)(a), the current real exchange rate equals the long—term real
exchange rate time the ratio of interest rates to the n—tb power. In logs, the
log real exchange rate equals a constant plus n times the n—period real interest
rate differential, as shown in (13)(a). According to (12)(b), the current nominal
exchange rate equals the current price ratio, times the long—term real exchange
rate, times the ratio of gross interest rates to the n—th power. The log ver-
sion of the equation is shown as (13)(b).
As we can see, small changes in the long—term real interest rate— 39—
differentialwill have a large effect on the current exchange rate. Suppose
thathome and foreign prices can be taken as given in the current period, and
that the real exchange rate is always expected to adjust to R within a ten—year
period. Then, a one percentage point rise in the 10—year U.S. real interest
rate relative to the foreign 10—year real interest rate will have a ten
percentage effect on the spot exchange rate today.
The twin assumptions that interest rate differentials reflect expected
exchange rate changes, and that the long—term real exchange rate is constant, go
a long way towards tracking exchange rate nvements in the past decade. To show
this,let us apply the framework to the Dollar—Deutsche Mark rate. This is a
particularly useful rate to examine, since unlike France, Japan, and the United
Kingdom,Germany had no capitalcontrolsinthe past decade, andso the
assumptionof high substitutability of dollar and DM assets is plausible. For
interest rateswetake indexes of long—term government bonds in each country.
The expected inflation variable is calculated as follows. For each year, I take
the "long—term" inflation expection to equal the actual two—year inflation rate
centeredon the quarter of the estimate (that is, the average of inflation one
year ahead and one year behind). However, in the case of the United States, I
allow for a shift in inflation expectations that depend on the 1980 election.
Forthe four quarters leading up to 1980, I assume that inflation forecasts were
made conditional on the outcome of the election, with inflation expectations of
10percent in the qp.arters after 1980 if President Carter won re—election, and
inflationof its actual rate after 1980 if Reagan won the election. The
probability assigned to Carter's re—election is set at 0.5. In this way, I— I0—
build in a downward shift in inflation expectations upon President Reagan's
election. This shift seems necessaiy to help explain the sharp appreciation of
the dollar following the election in November 1980. The resulting paths for
inflation expectations are shown in Figure -t.Thelong—term real interest rates
are shown in Figure 5.
An exchange rate equation as in (13) fits the data rather well for
19TT:ll981t:)4 for the $/DM rate. Estimating (13) using the real interest rate
differential that we have calculated, we get the equations shown in Table 6. In
the first equation, (13)(a) is estimated using OLS. The real interest rate
differential is highly significant, with the coefficient value indicating an
expectation of the return of Rt to R in 6.5 years. Note that because of the
flatness of the yield curve for maturities greater than 5 years, r_r* can be
interpreted as representing the interest rate differential over any long
interval. The equation picks 6.5asthe maturity length that is nst consistent
withthe maintained 1pothesis that Et returns to its long—run value R within
the interval. Note the low Durbin—Watson statistic in the estimate, suggesting
somemispecification of the equation. Data inspection revealed that the dollar
was weaker than expected in the recession period in l98l:3_l982:1, and somewhat
stronger than predicted in 1983. Similarly, the DM was weak during periods of
slow growth. This suggests that the real exchange rate strengthens, for a given
interest rate differential, when the econonr is experiencing above—average
growth, which is confirmed in equation (2), which included the difference in (MW
growth rates in the U.S. and Germany, Q_Q*.Thisvariable may be picking up
shifts in expectations about the long—run real exchange rate (contrary to our





















































































































































































































 Table 6:RealExchange Rate Equations, 1971:1 —1984:14










(3) log R =—3.3+0.068(r_r*) +1.50(Q—Q*) t
(10.5) (2.rr)
with instrumental variable (G_G*) for (r_r*)
=.87
d.w. =1.20
Source: R. is EP/P*, where E is DM/$, and areCPIs in the U.S. and
Germany. r,r* are long—term real interest rates, as calculated in the text.
Q,Q*arereal GNP growth rates, quarterly at an annual rate. The instrument
(G_G*) is the cumulative difference in the "fiscal impulse" (effectively, the
difference in the full employment surpluses, as calculated by the IMP).- 1-
are high at the upswing of the cycle. In the third regression, an instrumental
variableis used to help correct for errors in measurement of the real exchange
rate differential. On the view that the differential fiscalstimulus in the
U.S.and Germany is the cause of the real interest rate differential, an index
ofthis difference is created to serve as an instrument, based on an IMF measure
of fiscal impulse in the two countries. The result of the instrumental
variables estimation is shown in equation (3) of the table. Note that the point
estimate on the interest rate differential rises to .068.
Using our inflation forecasts, and the actual th of interest rates, we
can also invert equation (13) to find the expectation of the long—tenn real
exchange rate conditional on the assumption that the real interest rate measures
theexpected rate of real depreciation over the interval of the bond. This
"long—term" real exchange rate may be calculated for each time period, as is
done for the interval 19T7:l_1981:14. As per the econometric estimates we assume
return to R in years. The result is shown in Figure 6. According to these
estimates, real appreciation of the dollar does not reflect the expectation of a
long—termappreciation of the dollar but rather of ashort—run deviation from a
fairlyconstant long—run rate. In 1977:1, the market projection was for a
long—term real exchange rate of 106 (1977:1 =100),and the projection in 1981:14
was for a long—run real exchange rate of 99.Whilethe dollar appreciated by
about 140percent in real tents after 1980:14, the market expectationof the
long—run real exchange rate is about the same as in 1980:14. The rise in the
dollar is consistent with unchanged expectations of the long—run real exchange















































































































































































































































































 rates of about )4percentagepointssincel98O:4.
If the expectations model is accepted, the fact that long—term real
interest rates in the U.S. are far higher than in GermarrandJapan nans that
expectations are for a dollar depreciation at approximately the rate of interest
ratedifferential for the next decades. A skeptic can argue that this interest
rate differential has been present for the past four years, during which time
the dollar has continued to appreciate, so that the "expectations" in the expec-
tationsmodel havenever been borne out. The response to this observation in
termsof the expectations hypothesis is that there have been continual surprises
in terms of long—term real interest rate differentials over the period. U.S.
long—term interest rates have stayed unexpectedly high, and the rate of U.S.
inflation has dropped unexpectedly rapidly.Thedollar has strengthened in each
of the past three years because the real interest rate differential continued
to rise, and nDst of that rise was probably unanticipated.
Let us assume that the analysis is correct, and proceed to investigate the
inflationary consequences of a future depreciation of the dollar. As usual, we
examine the partial effect, for a fixed path of output and foreign inflation.
Suppose, then, that the dollar will depreciate 1O percent in the 7years.
If the drop is sharp and swift (the hard—landing scenario in Marris' account
elsewhere in this issue), the spike to domestic inflation will likewise be
sharp. If the drop is slow the inflationary consequences in any year are muted,
but the adjustment is stretched out for longer. According to our structural
estimates, in the unconstsrained case, the inflationary consequences of a hard—
landing (defined as l4 percent depreciation per year for three years) and soft— I3—
landing (defined as 6 percent depreciation per year for seven years) beginning
in 1986, are as follows:
Inflation Effects of Depreciation
1986 1987 1988
"Hard" landing 1.0 2.I 3.6
"Soft" landing 0.4 1.0 1.6
Rememberthat these are not forecasts of the inflation following a decline in
the dollar, since they assume for analytical purposes that the path of output is
independent of the path of the exchange rate. As noted later, the policy
authoritiesmight well choose to respond to a sharp drop in the dollar wIth a
mild recession, to mute the inflationary consequences.
TheStrong Dollar as a Macroeconomic Strater Ina Single Econonr
Weare now prepared to turn to the question raised at the opening of
the paper. Does itmakesenseto pursue a policy mixaiming atastrong
currencyfor the purpose of easing the costs of disinflation? Can the
"sacrifice ratio"be reducedby- a strong dollar in the early phase of a
disinflation,or does the strategy xrely push the costsintothe future?
Ifin fact the total costs of disinflation are unchanged over the long term,
is there any justification left for pursuing such a policy? Finally, even
if the policy- makes sense from a single country's point of view, is the
decision to pursue such a policy essentially abeggar—thy—neighbor decision?
Whathappens ifallcountries try to pursue the strong currency approach?_114
We turn first to an extended discussion of the policy mix from a single
countrys point of view, and turn later to some of the multi—country issues.
Mundell's original notion in the 1911 essay is that a mix of tight
money and expansionary fiscal policy can reduce inflation and maintain
output at the same time. In principle, the short—term sacrifice ratio can
be reduced to zero if all of the disinflation is brought about by currency
appreciation, with fiscal policy being expansionary enough to offset the
contractionary tendencies of tight money.Considera numerical illustration
from my paper with Gilles Oudiz in the BPEA 198L:1. The policy multipliers from
the EPA model are reproduced in Table 1. The multipliers shown are the average
effects of shifts in M and G over a two—year period. Below, I will offer
independent estimates of these effects, that display somewhat larger
movements in the exchange rate for a given change in policy. (In the EPA
model, exchange rate expectations are essentially backward—looking, while in
the model below, they are forward looking. That, and nv assumption of very
asset substitutability between currencies, seem to be the major distinctions in
the magnitude of the estimated effects.)
In every country, a normalized fiscal expansion is less inflationary than a
normalized monetary expansion (by normalized expansion I mean a change in G or M
sufficient to raise output by one percentage point on average in the first two
years). Consequently, a fiscal expansion with an exactly offsetting monetary
contraction leaves output unchanged, but inflation lower. In Japan, for
example, a 2.5 percentage point increase in discount rates, balanced by a






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































inflation by (0.59—O.lB)0.51 percentage points ——azero sacrifice ratio! Is
this the long sought after anti—inflation machine? No, for two reasons. First,
the policy works through a currency appreciation that raises prices abroad, in
the countries with the counterpart depreciating currencies. Thus, while Japan's
inflation is costlessly reduced by the policy mix, world inflation as a whole is
left unchanged. In the case of Japan, according to the EPA model, the
repercussion effects on foreign inflation rates in Germany and the United States
appear to be very small. Since Japan alone is a relatively small part of the
OECD econorry, a given inflation reduction in Japan translates into a much
smaller inflation increase in the other OECD economies. For a very small
country, a given reduction in inflation at home will be balanced by a negligible
increase abroad, but an average of world inflation (which gives the small
country very little weight) will show that there is no change in the global
average.
Second, the policy mix is probably not sustainable for long. Note that
the proposed policy mix also worsens the current account, in this case by
(—0.13) minus (—0.02), or by .11 percent of GNP in Japan. Over time, those
external deficits would cause foreign indebtedness to build, which would reduce
real consumption opportunities of future generations, and for a variety of
reasons, eventually cause the currency to depreciate.
According to the EPA model, even the short—run usefulness of a shift to
fiscal expansion and monetary contraction appears to be rather small in the
U.S.,sincethere is little quantitative effect of either policy oninflation.
Basedon the evidence presented earlier in the paper, the opportunities for the—46—
U.S.have probably been niich greater than shown in the EPA model.
It is useful to consider a single—period optimization problem of the
macroeconomic authorities when presented with the opportunities just examined.
Following the framework set out in Oudiz and Sachs, BPEA 1984:1, suppose that
policymakers have a quadratic loss function in three targets, output (measured
as a gap from potential), inflation, and the current account:
(114) u= -(1/2)(Q2+ni2+CA2)
Suppose further, that the relationship between M and G and the three fiscal










Becausefiscal expansion tends to appreciate the exchange rate (or at least to
cause a smaller depreciation than monetary- policy), we expect the value of
aG to be less than a, and the value of aactobe greater than aMC. That is,
consistent with the results of Table 7,fiscalexpansion is less inflationary
thanmonetary expansion, and fiscal expansionis more adverse for the external
balancethan is monetary policy.
Now suppose that the economy has an inflation problem, in the sense that if
it chooses to set M =G=0(these arepolicy settings as deviations from a
baselinelevel), it achievesfull employment and external balance, but has an
inflationrate above the optimum. Specifically, we set the constants and
CA0 to zero, and set it0> 0.What policy mix should the country- pursue? By















Asexpected, the optimal policy is to choose M less than zero, and G greater
than zero, and thereby reduce inflation at the cost of a larger external
deficit. By substituting (12) ick in to the structural model, we find the











The built—in inflation is met by policy actions that reduce output,
implicitly overvalue the exchange rate, and cause an external deficit.Note that the policy mix may be reversed if the econourj inherits an
external balance problem in addition to an inflation problem. Suppose now
that CA0isnow negative, while remains positive. Now a choice of M =G
=0would leave the countiy with full emplcyment, but with high inflation
and an external deficit beyond the desired level. Optimizing once again, we




















0M' 0G'as in (16).
Notethat the following structural characterisitics militate against the
Mundell mix: (1) a high structural external deficit (i.e. a large value of
CA0); (2) a high loss parameter on external deficits; (3) a poor tradeoff of
output growth and external deficit, as given by the coefficient on G in the
current account equation, a (that is, a normalized fiscal stimulus causes a
large worsening of external balance); and ()asmall differential in the
inflation effects of M and G (as measured by a —a).
So much for the static version of the model. We have seen in practice that
the large appreciation of the dollar is expected to be reversed in the next ten— )49—
years, so that the short—run gains to inflation will later be lost. What are
the merits of the strater given that real exchange rate gains tend to he
temporary? Stanley Fischer (l98) has recently pointed out that these merits
depend crucially on the type of wage—price process in the econoiny.2- In settings
were wages are "backward—looking" functions of inflation, the merits will tend
to be qualitatively different than in economies with wage change depending on
rational expectations of future policy actions. Fischer's analysis is extremely
illuminating on this point, though his focus is on shifts inthesacrifice ratio
whenmonetary policy and capital controls are the instruments available to the
macro authorities, and he does not consider fiscal policy. The next section
extends his analysis to the question of the policy mix of fiscal and monetary
variables.
Consider first the case of backward—looking wage behavior. As a simple
illustration, assume that wage change equals lagged CPI price change, and the
CPIis a markup over domestic wages andforeigngoods prices. The foreign
currency price of foreign output is fixed, and foreign producers fully pass










Thissystem yields the following equation for inflation:—50—
(20) = + — e(Rt_Rti), e=(i—x)/x
Current inflation equals lagged inflation, plus an output effect, plus a
negative effect for appreciations of the real exchange rate (Rt_Ri) <o.
For the dynamic problem, the utility function is now written as the
discounted sum of period—by—period utilities, with a discount factorless than
one (technically, we are assuming an additively separable intertemporal loss
function). We also write utility directly as a function ofR,rather than the
current account balance:
(21) V =—1/2 t(Q2÷242)
The econony inherits a given rate of wage inflation at t0, and thereafter
pursues an optimal path of policies of M and G, that minimizes V in(17).
Insteadof focussing on M and G, we imore simply assume that these two
instruments can be used to control the two targets and Rt in each period.
At time zero we assume that the econoimj begins with the real exchange rate R0=0
In this illustration, the Government credibly commits itself to the entire
future sequence of actions (an assumption I return to skeptically later on).
Before solving for the optimum policy, let us examine the options actually
open to the policy maker. By solving (21) forward for T periods, we see that
inflation at time T is a function of inherited inflation, ytimesthe cumulative
outputloss between t=0 and t=T, and the level of the real exchange rate at T:
(22) 11T =— T_lQ—
ORT
Aside from the issue of whether the policy authority could actually commit to a
permanent rise in B (and obtain sufficient foreign finance to run the implied—51—
currentaccount deficits), it will not in fact be optimal for the policy maker
to choose such a course in this example. Over time, optimal policy implies that
inflation return to zero, output return to full employment, and B return to
zero (given the utility function assumed here). Hence, as T gets large, we
expect to approach zero. From equation (22) we can see an important
result, first shown by Buiter and Miller.22 In an economy with backward—looking
wagesetters, in which the long—term real exchange rate returns to its initial
given an optimal policy path), the cumulative output
given inherited inflation to zero in the long run is
the path of the real exchange rate that is followed.
get large in (22), let RT tend to zero, and examine
tozero. Then we see that the cumulative output loss
level (either perforce, or
loss necessary to reduce a
fixed, and independent of
To see this,simply let P
thecase in whichgoes
is simply given as:
(23) =
The long—term sacrifice ratio, defined as the cumulative output loss from
t0 to t,dividedby the reduction in inflation, 110, is a constant which
is independent of the exchange rate strater! Specifically, the sacrifice
ratiois (l/y), where y is the Phillips curve parameter in the wage
equation.
Does this mean that Mundell is wrong, and that there is nothing to be
gained from a strong currency policy?
The answer is no. With reasonable assumptions on intertemporal utility,
the policy mix of tight soney and loose fiscal policy (or equivalently, of—52—
increasesin R) still may make sense in the beginning phase of of disinflation.
The short runs gains on inflation from raising R.t above zeromay plausibly
exceedthe longer run costs of higher inflation when Rt returns tozero. The
key assumption that can make this the case is that there are increasing marginal
costs of inflation, so that on the margin a reductionin inflation from, say, 10
percentage points per year to 9 percentagepoints peryear,has a higher utility
value(in terms of output that would be willingly foregone) thana reduction in
inflation from 2 percentage points to 1 percentage point. This kind of effect
is eminently plausible, most directly because the excess burden of taxes
(including the inflation tax) can be described as a function of thesquare of
the tax rate. This assumption is clearly built in to the quadratic utility
function in (21).
Consider the formal optimization of V in (21) subject to the constraints in
(20). Let At be the shadow cost in terms of intertemporalutility of an
increment to inherited inflation at time t. The first—order conditions for the






In(a) we have the obvious result that the optimal output contraction in period
tis greater the larger is the welfare cost on inherited inflation in period t,
At. An optimal disinflation path begins with a steep recession, and then a
gradual return to full employment as the inflation rate ebbs to zero. More—53—
importantlyfor our purposes here, note that (b) shows that Rt should be
proportional to inflation along the optimal disinflation path! In other words,
along an optimal path, there is an initial real exchange rate appreciation when
inflation is high, and a declining real exchange rate as inflation returns to
zero.This path does not gain anything in terms ofthe long—term sacrifice
ratio, but it raises utility relative to a disinflation path with a constant
real exchange rate. The reason is simple: by raising H early in the process,
some of the inflation is exported abroad without having to incur further costly
output losses; later on, the same amount of inflation is re—imported as H falls.
The welfare gain arises from the fact that the marginal utility gain from a unit
of inflation reduction when inflation is high (early in the disinflation)
exceeds the marginal utility loss from a unit of inflation increase later on
when the inflation rate is already low.
In broad outline, then the Reagan disinflation hashadsome, but not other,
characteristics of an optimal disinflation path. The process began with a deep
recession,andwasfollowedby a gradual return to full employment. The real
exchange rate wasincreasedin the early part of the disinflation, and will pre-
sumably fall in the later stages of the process. Of course, depending on the
weights one attaches to inflation, output, and external balance in the utility
function, different degrees of recession or real appreciation will be called
for. The question we pick up later, however, is whether the continuation of
current policies is likeby to be appropriate as well. Note that an optimal path
builds in a steady real depreciation after the initial expansion. This model
and the results later on suggest that the actual U.S. fiscal expansion has been—5 )4_
carried too far, too long, from the point of view of optimal disinflation. As
inflation was reduced the dollar should have depreciated in real terms,
accordingto the model. Exactly the opposite has occurred to date.
In an economy with forward—looking wage setters, itmay bepossible to
gaineven more by the Mundell strategy. Indeed, in some not—implausible models,
the sacrifice ratio can be reduced to almost zero by a policy of fiscal
expansionand monetary contraction in the first phase of disinflation. As an
extreme illustration, consider the earlier model, but now with a wage process in
which the (log) wage for period t+l is set in t, butbasedon forward—looking
expectations of the price level. The wage equation becomes:
(25) w+1 =
where signifies the expectation of consumer prices in period t+l, held
as of period t. In each period, the nominal wage is predetermined, so that
macroeconomic policymakers retain period—by—period control over the output level
in the economy. The change between periods in the wage, however, depends on
expectations of future policies.
The remaining structure ofthe economy is as follows. Output is demand
determined,with aggregate demand a decreasing function of Rt and an
increasing function of G. Consumer prices are a weightedaverage of w and p*_e
as in (19). Since B =pC+e_p*,we also have B =A(w+e_p*).Foreign prices p41





Wecan think of the policymaker as choosing e and Gt in the period, with e
implicitly controlled by monetary policy, which we hold in the backgroud for the
moment.
Now, suppose that the economy inherits some wage inflation, in that
exceeds w1. The exchange rateatt—l is given as eti.Thus,consumer price





From the assumption of forward—looking wage behavior, wage setters note that
expected p÷1 equals the nominal exchange rate expected in the following
period. This is because =
Xwt+1
-(1—X)et+1,and with w11 equal to
we have w =t+l t+l
There is no fixed sacrifice ratio in this econow, either in the short
runorthe long run. One strategy for policy makers is to absorb the current
inflation with accoinodating exchange rate or fiscal policy (that is, with
Gt hii enough or et low enough to hold output fixed), and to announce a value
of the future exchange rate equal to today's consumer price level. After one
period of inflation, the inflation rate vanishes costlessly. More strikingly,
usingthe Mundell strategy, the policymakers can eliminate current inflation as
well, and still maintain full employment throughout! The idea is straightfor-
ward:the exchange rate today is set at a high enough level so that current
inflation is zero. According to (2T), et is chosen to equal [X(wt_wt_i) +
(l_X)e1]/(l_X).This involves a real appreciation in R in the amount
X(wt_wti)/(l_X). Then fiscal policy is expanded sufficiently so that aggregate
(2T)— 56—
demandis not reduced by the high real exchange rate.Forthe next period,
policymakers announce a value of' the future exchange rate so that
e+1=p,, and a return of fiscal policy to zero. Wages for period t+l then
revert to a non—inflationary level, and the real exchange rate returnsto zero.
Note that workers get a big realwage increase in period t from the real
exchange rate appreciation in period t, thich they thenwillingly give up in
period t+l.
The Mundell mix then allows for a complete elimination ofinflation at
zero output cost. Suppose that policy makers instead reduce the current
inflation through exchange rate policy alone (i.e.through tight money),
without the benefit of fiscal expansion. In thatcase, et would be moved to
the level we just found, but now output would fall becauseof the real
appreciation. The decline in output would be given by
_[a/(l_A)](wt_w1).
Obviously, the Mundell strater has improved the path of
output, even when viewed over the entire futurehorizon.As before the
announcement of future e would be sufficient to hold inflation tozero in the
future.
Stepping back and comparing this model with the case ofbackward—looking
wage setting, we can make the following points. In this model with
anticipatory wage setters, inflation can be talked away in the futuremerely by
credible announcements of tight control over nominal variables (here,the
exchange rate; more generally, the money supply, exchange rate, etc.). Theonly
problemwith eliminating current inflation is thatwage contracts build in some
wage stickiness over the duration of the contracts. One possible policy isto-51-
reduceinflation at the same pace as contracts expire, so as not to jeopardize
output. But another more aggressive policy is to use an exchange rate
overvaluation to reduce inflation in the time period in which current contracts
remain in force. The potentially contractionary effects coming from the real
appreciation are then offset by a temporary fiscal expansion. The Mundell
strategy doesnot need to last longer than the length of the longest contracts
(assuming that wages are set on the basis of future prices, rather than on an
averageof wages,as in Taylor's staggered contracts models). A temporary
appreciationis the way around a set of pre—existing wage settlements.
Importantly, in this model, the economy does not really re—absorb the inflation
thatit exports in theinitialperiod. When the real exchange rate falls,
workersaccept theimplicit real wage reduction without demanding a catch—up in
nominal wages. This is because the real appreciation itself in the firstperiod
drives the realwageabove its long—run target level, so that workers are
willing to see the real wage fall back to the target.
Tosummarize the arguments of this section, the Mundell mix ofloose fiscal
policyand tight monetary policy can reduce the sacrifice ratio in the short
run, and may or may not reduce the sacrifice ratio in the long run. In the
case of backward—looking wage setting, the real appreciation is a method of
redistributing the burden of adjustment over time, in order to make more rapid
gains against inflation when inflation is high, and accept the costs of higher
imported inflation when inflation is low. In the case of forward—looking wage
behavior, the strategy might actually reduce the sacrifice ratio to zero, in
that it provides a vehicle for cutting inflation and maintaining output in the—58—
shortperiod in which existing wage contracts remaininforte. Long—tenn,
painless disinflation is no problem in the model, under the (strong) assumption
that governments can make credible commitments to future non—inflationary
policies.
The Policy Mix in the Multi—Country Setting
In a world econory in which individual countriespursue policies in a
non—cooperative setting (i.e. not subject to supra—national controls, IMF
surveillance, economic treaties, etc.) the previous analysis will apply on a
country—by—country basis. If manycountriesare simultaneously attempting to
disinflate, each will have an incentive to pursue a tightmoney,loose fiscal
policy in order to strengthen the currency. Of course, differing concerns in
each country regarding public, deficits or external deficitsmay cause the vigor
with which the policy mix is pursued to vary.
As described in some detail in Ondiz and Sachs, BPEA l98t:l, theresulting
non—cooperative global equilibrium is likely to be inefficient, in the sense
thatall countries can come closer to their targets if they make some
cooperative adjustments to their policies. The reason for inefficiency in this
particular case shouldbeclear. In aclosed world system, not all countries
cansimultaneously appreciate their currencies vis—a--vis theother countries.
Indeed,in a fully symmetricsetting, allreal exchange rates between identical
countries would be constant over time in equilibrium, even though fromthe
perspectiveof each policy authority, the country's own real exchange rate would—59—
appear to be a choice variable. The common attempt of all countries to
appreciate will simply cancel out.
To the extent that there are side costs to running large budget deficits
and a tight monetary policy, the (failed) attempt of each country to appreciate
will impose pure deadweight losses on the world economy. The policy xaix can
produce undesirably high world interest rates, or too rapid growth in public
indebtness, without achieving any inflation gains for any individual country.
Even if some countries pursue the mix more aggressively than others (which
is certainly true for the U.S. vis—a-vis Europe and Japan in recent years), the
world equilibrium is still likely to be Pareto inefficient, with a bias towards
too high budget deficits throughout the world. One could surmise, for example,
that in the absence of the recent U.S. policy mix, the European and Japan
economies would have maintained looser monetary policies, and even tighter
fiscalpolicies, but were constrained from doing so by fears over further
currency depreciation. In Oudiz and Sachs, Table l4, we used an optimization
frameworkto show that in the event of a U.S.fiscal contraction cum monetary
expansion,the optimal response of Japan and West Germanywouldbe to follow
with similar changes. Similarly, usingformal techniques of dynamic
optimization, Sachs andMckibbin gives an extended illustration of how
non—cooperative policy making within the OECD is likely to lead to excessive
budget deficits andrealinterest rates in aperiod of disinflation.2
Thus, the Mundellmix is most justifiable from an individual country's
perspective,and is perhaps actually pernicious when viewed from the global
perspective. Our welfareevaluation of alternative policies in the next section—6o—
musttherefore be viewed from a strictly national perspective, taking as given
the policy actions in the rest of the world.
Policy Optimization in a Medium—Scale Simulation Model
In this section we draw together the pieces of our analysis, by estimating
optimal policies for disinflation in the United States within a structural model
of global macroeconomic adjustment. The model has been designed and refined in
joint work with Warwick McKibbin and Gilles Oudiz. It is a dynamic model of the
world economy with four regions (the U.S., rest of OECD, non—oil LDCs, and OPEC)
speciallydesigned for policy optimization studies. I use the model here for
three purposes: (1) to see whether, in broad outline, the movements of the
dollar can be explained in a structural model in terms of shifts in
macroeconomic policies in the U.S. and the ROECD (rest of OECD); (2) to see
whether from the vantage point of 1980, the mix of fiscal expansion and monetary
contraction had merit for the U.S.; and(3)to assess the prospects for future
developments of the U.S. price level and external balance, in view of the large
appreciation of the dollar since 1980.
A complete description of the simulation model is available in Sachs and
McKibbin (1981).25 Here an outline of the model will be given. As a general
matter, the model has several features which make it particularly attractive for
the type of policy analysis undertaken here. First, the important stock—flow
relationshipsand intertemporal budget constraints are carefully observed,
so that the long—run properties of the model are reasonable. Budget deficits,
forexample, cumulateinto a stock of public debt which must be serviced, while—6i—
current account deficits cumulate into a stock of foreign debt. Second, the
asset markets are forward looking, so that the exchange rate is conditioned by
the entire future path of policies rather than by a set of short—mn
expectations.This model differs in this fundamental regard from all of the
large—scale world econometric models.
The model is for a four—region division of the world econonr. Only the
developed country bloc (the U.S. and ROIECD) havean internal macroeconomic
structure; the LDC's and OPEC are modelled only with respect to their
international trade and financial linkages. Each region produces a single
output, which is an imperfect substitute in consumption for the outputs of the
otherregions. Every region therefore exportsand imports to the other regions,
withthe extent of trade parametrized on the baseline to correspond to a
direction—of—trade matrix for 1983. Importantly, it is assumed that potential
growth of GDP is fixed at 3 percent per year in both the U.S. and the ROECD, so
that I do not examine at all the long—term growth effects of alternative policy
mixes. In anyevent,there would be no easy waytopursue the more ambitious
taskof building in endogenous growth of potential GDP as a function of policy
variables as crudely defined as government aggregate expenditure and taxation.
A cut in tax revenues of a given percent of GNP, for example, can be detrimental
to the growth of potential GNP if the tax cut finances increased consumption,
while it might spur growth if the tax cut is made in orderto subsidize capital
expenditures(as with much of the Reagan tax cuts on capital income).
In the U.S. and the ROECD, output is demand determined along conventional
lines. In any period, the nominal wage is predetermined, and domestic prices—62—
arewrittenas a fixed markup over wages. While domestic prices aregiven,
consumer prices can of course vary within a period because of movements in the
nominalexchange rate. Aggregate demand is the sum of private domestic
absorbtion,exports net of imports, and government spending (which is assumed to
fail, on the margin, entirely on homegoods). Private absorbtion combines
personalconsumption expenditure and investment expenditure in one behavioral
relation. The level of total absorbtion is written as a function of disposable
income (defined as GDP net of taxes), the real interest rate r, and the stock of
financial wealth of households. The real interest rate is the nominal interest
rate minus the rationally anticipated change in domestic goods prices in the
next period. In the version of the model reported here, each period signifies
one calendar year. Note that current absorbtion is written as a function of
currentdisposable income rather that permanent income. This specification of
course builds in a strong presumption that the time path of taxes affects the
timepath of private absorbtion, even for a given discounted value of the total
tax burden.
International financial flows are assumed to be completely dollar
denominated, with ROECD, LDC, and OPEC residents holding dollar denominated
assets and liabilities, but with U.S. residents not holding any claims in
non—dollar currencies. Thus all current account imbalances aresettledby
changes in net U.S dollar claims and liabilities. Dollar assets are assumed
to be imperfect substitutes for ECU denominated assets, with the required risk
premium a function,la Tobin, of the relative stocks of ECU and dollar assets
in the ROECD portfolio. In practice a very high degree of substitutability is—63—
assumed, in line with the suggestive evidence on real interestrates and the
dollardescribed earlier.
A few of the key parameter values in the behavioral equations can help in
understanding the effects of policies in the model. At the point of
linearization the following elasticities are assumed:
the effect of a 1 percentage point increase in the
short—term real interest rate on private absorbtion
expediture: decline of .1 percent of absorbtion.
the effect of a $1 increase in income on private
absorbtion expenditure: increase of 7O.
the effect of a $1 increase in financial wealth on private
absorbtion expenditure: increase of 1Oç.
theeffect of a 1 percent real appreciation of the dollar
vis—a—vis the ECU on U.S. imports from ROECD: a rise of 1.5
percent.
the effect of a 1 percent real appreciation of the dollar on
U.S. exports to Europe: decline of 1.5 percent.
the effect of a 1 percent increase in OECD imports from the
LDC's on the LDC terms of trade (i.e. on the relative price
ofLDCcommodities):increase of .5percent.
theeffect of a 1 percent increase in OECD imports from OPEC
on the relative priceof OPEC exports: increase of .5
percent.
The role of the exchange rate on domestic inflation is based on a pricing
model that is somewhat different from the stractural model derived earlier in
the paper. In the global mDdelling for the simulation model it was convenient
todistinguish goods by country—of—origin rather than by class of commodity.— 61 —
Goodsfrom ROECD and LDC are assumed to enter the consumerprice levelwith a
weight equal to the ratio of U.S. imports from each region as a percentage of
U.S. GNP. The weight for OPEC is set at 0.01, to reflect both the import and
domestic production effects of a change in world oil prices. In particular, in
the U.S. the following consumer price index equation is specified:
(28) Pc =0.89w +0.05ROECD +0.02LDC +o.o1OPEC
The ROECD currency bundle will be termed the ECU (with due apologies to
Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Canada .. .). Itis assumed that for given
local currency prices in the ROECD, an exchange rate change is passed through
100 percent within the year into U.S. import prices of ROECD goods. Thus, from
(28), the direct effect of a 10 percent depreciation of the ECU on the U.S.
price index is 0.5 percent. it is also assumed that the price of LDC goods and
OPEC goods are fixed as markups over price indexes of OECD goods from the other
regions, where the markups are a rising function of the level of total exports.
In other words, the dollar price of OPEC exports is given as:
(29) OPEC =0.09PUS +0.*3ROECD +o.18LDC +0.5log
The weights here are based on OPEC import shares in 1983. This may be regarded
as an OPEC supply curve, making the supply of exports a rising function of the
relative export price. The weights attached by OPEC to U.S. prices and ROECD
prices is assumed to be fixed by the proportion of OPEC spending in the two
areas (it could also have been based on the extent of U.S. and ROECD purchases
from OPEC, depending on the underlying model of supply). There is a similar
equation for LDC pricing, given by:—65—
(30)LDC =0.20 +0.50R0ECD +0.30pE +0.5log
Takentogether, we can calculate the direct and indirect first—period effect
of a 10 percent currency appreciation of the dollar relative to the ECU, and
this is found to be 1 percent.
PLsdescribed earlier, the wage equation maybe specified as forward or
backwardlooking, or some combination of the two. The specification chosen
allows for level and rate—of—change effects of output on wage inflation.
Note that Qinthis equation is to be regarded as the deviation of output from




Notethat t+l is the period texpectationof consumer price inflation in period
t+1, i.e. Forthe backward—looking wage behavior, a=1.We also
set y== .2.With y equal to .2, the long—run sacrifice ratio is
approximately 5(1/.2).
Under the assumption of backward—looking wage behavior (a =1),the system
just outlined has properties that are very close to those estimated earlier. In
particular, consider the effects of a 10 percent appreciation of the dollar in
the model, and compare them with the annual averages of the quarterly nidel
(unconstrained version) estimated earlier:
Year 1 2 3
Quarterly Model —0.7' —1.0 —0.9
Simulation Model —1.0 —0.9 —0.8
The dynamic effects ofU.S.fiscal and monetary policies are shown in
Tables 8 and 9. The fiscal policy is a sustained, bond—financed U.S.fiscalTable 8:Effects of U.S. Fiscal Expansion













U.S. Inflation D —0.3 0.0 0.2 0.2
U.S. InterestRate 0 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2
Exchange Rate(E/$) % 3.9 3.9 4.0 4.0
OECD GDP % 0.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.3
OECD Inflation % 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2












—23.6Table 9: Effects of U.S. Monetary Expansion





















0 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.3
D -0.4 0.4 0.2 0.3
°h -0.8 —0.3 —0.6 -0.7
% 0.0 0.1 0.0 —0.1
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expansion. The monetary policy is a one percent increase in the money- supply,
expected to be permanent. The expansion begins as a 1% of GNP rise in govern-
ment expenditures on home goods, with no initial change in taxes. Over tis,
the higher expenditure level is left unchanged, but taxes are raised in line
with rising debt—servicing charges. Note that to read the table, "%"signifies
percentage deviation from a baseline simulation; "D" signifies an absolute dif-
ference from the baseline; "$bl" signifies billions of current dollars deviation
from baseline; and "$81"signifiesbillions of constant, 19814 dollars deviation
from baseline.
In the case of a U.S. fiscal expansion, we find a rise in GD? of 0.8
percent relative to the baseline in the first year, and a fall in inflation of
0.3 percentage points. The inflation reduction has two sources, one of them
spurious: on the one hand the fiscal expansion causes the exchange rate to
appreciate by 3.8 percentage points, which has a direct passthrough effect on
import prices, and from them to consumer prices. More dubiously, the Phillips
curve effect of higher output on prices operates with a full year lag. In the
second year of the shock, inflation is 0.0 percentage points higher than in the
baseline. U.S. short—term interest rates rise by 70 basis points in the first
year, and by 100 basis points in the third year. The U.S. current account
worsens by about O.1 percentage points of GD?, and then continues to worsen in
the next three years. Note that a 5.0 percent of GNP swing of fiscal policy
causes a CA swing of about 2.0 percent of GNP. This is about the order of
magnitude of the swing in fiscal policy and the current account since 1980,so

































































































































































As explained in Sachs and Wyplosz (1984, op. cit.), the short—run appre-
ciation of the dollar is reversed in the long run, for several reasons. The
persistent current account deficits of the U.S. cause a shift in world wealth,
which tends to diminish demand for U.S. goods. Second, the share of dollar
denominated assets in ROECD portfolios rises, and over time this induces a
growing risk premium on U.S. denominated claims. U.S. interest rates rise, and
the dollar tends to weaken. Importantly, the model does not signal any need for
a rapid reversal of the appreciation, as shown in Figure 7. The nominal
exchange rate does not return to its initial level until about 15 years after
the expansion.
The implications of a U.S. monetary expansion are shown next. A U.S.
monetary expansion causes a more inflationary boom than does fiscal policy,
since the exchange rate depreciates on impact. Per unit of GD? gain, monetary
policy is more inflationary, but also less adverse to the current account
balance. The U.S. current account actually improves slightly on impact, but
then worsens over time. The differential impacts of monetary and fiscal policy
have the following implications. A mix of fiscal expansion (G rising by 1.1
percent of GNP) and monetary contraction (M falling by 0.8 percent relative to
trend), causes: no output change; an inflation reduction of 0.4 percentage
points in the first year; and a worsening of the current account of about 4.4
percent of GNP.
Can this model hope to reproduce the essential quantitative aspects of
the U.S. disinflation and strong dollar of the past four years? The answer is
yes. Suppose that the U.S. and ROECD were on a particular adjustment path up—68—
until the policy changes of 1981. Let us describe the changes relative to that
old baseline as follows:
a sustained U.S. debt financed fiscal expansion of 5
percent of GNP;
a sustained ROECD fiscal contraction of 2 percent of
ROECD GNP;
a substantial tightening of U.S. monetary policy;
no change in ROECD monetary policy.
The degree of U.S. monetary tightening is calibrated so that the net effect of
monetary contraction and fiscal expansion is a recession with a GNP gap of 7.5
percent in the first year, and then a gradual recovery. This involves a sharp
fall in real money balances (7.5 percent relative to the baseline), and then a
path of nominal money growth slightly below inflation for the next two years.
This policy setting yields the path of variables shown in Table 10. The dollar
appreciates by 39.b percent relative to the ECU, and U.S. short—term real
interest rates rise by 8.0 percentage points relative to abroad. A protacted
period of unemployment ensues, with the U.S. returning gradually to full
employment. The U.S. inflation rate falls from 10 percent in the year before
the shift to 6.3 percent in the first year of the policy, 3.8 percent the next,
and so on gradually to zero inflation (the table records the drop in inflation
relative to the 10 percent per year inflation of the baseline). This simulation
does not attempt to capture the precise timing of exchange rate movements (for
that we would have to assess the expectations of the market with respect to
future policies in every period since 1980). Rather it illustrates thatTable 10: Simulated Effects of Shift in Policy Mix
in the U.S. and ROECD after 1980
1981 1982 1983 198)4
Real Exchange Rate 39.)4 32.6 29.8 27.1
Policy Shift
U.S. Fiscal Def/GNP )4.O )4.O )4.0 )4.O
U.S. Monetary Policy (Growth Ml) —7.5 _9.1 —7.6 —7.3
ROECD Fiscal Def/GNP —2.0 —2.0 —2.0 —2.0
ROECD Monetary Policy (Growth Ml) 0 0 0 0
Other Variables
U.S. GNP Gap —7.5 —6.1 —5.1 —)4.3
U.S. Inflation —3.7 —6.2 —7.0
(shift relative to baseline)
U.S. Interest Rate 10.0 8.8 6.9
(shift relative to baseline)
ROECD GNP Gap 3.7 —5.5 —)4.5
ROECDInflation i.lt 1.9 0 —0.5
(shiftrelative to baseline)
ROECD Interest Rate 2.0 2.1 0.5 —0.6
(shift relative to baseline)
Note: Monetary policy is defined as the percentage rate of money growth minus
the percentage rate of money- growth in the baseline path. For example,
the entry —7.5 in 1981 signifies a slowdown in Ml growth of 7.5
percentage points relative to the baseline.—69—
movementsin the value of the dollar of the magnitude observed since 1980 can be
captured insimulation exercise with plausible shifts in policy.
Now, it is time to examine the specific properties of optimal disinflation
paths in the model. One brief word must be said about the optimization tech-
nique. Unlike the illustration of optimal control policies pursued earlier, the
calculations described below are for so—called "time consistent" policies, in
which the optimization is made under the assumption that the government cannot
commit itself at a given moment to the entire future path of its actions.
Rather, it optimizes today with the understanding that it will have the oppor-
tunity (and unavoidable desire!) to re—optimize at each date in the future. The
government therefore optimizes today, taking as given that itwill be optimizing
inthe future. To solve the problem, backward recursion is used; in each period
the government computes its best policy taking as given the policies that it
will be pursuing in the future. Technically, the solution technique is dynamic
programming, rather than optimal control. The technical methodology employed
may be found in Oudiz and Sachs (l98), and an earlier illustration of the tech-
nique in Sachs and McKibbin (1981).26
For the utility function, I employ a quadratic loss function in the output
gap, inflation rate, an adjusted budget deficit relative to GDP, and an
adjusted current account deficit relative to GDP. Let bt =Bt/Qtbe the ratio
of public debt to potential GDP(). The adjusted budget deficit measure used
is (b÷1_b). Similarly, the adjusted current account measure is the change
in net foreign liabilities per unit of potential GDP, denoted dt÷i_dt. In long—
run equilibrium, both bt and dt reach a constant. This requires that the actual
level of public debt and of foreign indebtedness grow at the rate of potential—70—
GDP,which I take to be 3percent peryear.
The instantaneous utility function in period t is simply u =
— + + 4)2(bt+i_b)2+4)3(dt+i_dt)2].
The bliss point in each
period is output at potential = zero inflation (n =0),andnochange
in the two debt—GDP ratios (b+1_b =dt+i_dt =0).At the bliss point,
u =0;at all other points, u. <0.The intertemporal utility function is an




where 6 is the pure rate of time preference (set at 0.10 in the simulations that
follow). In all of the simulations that follow, 2 is set at ,and
4)3at
The value 4)isgiven three alternative values, signifying a "high" welfare
weight on output (4),=);a"medium" welfare weight on output '2 =);anda
"low" welfare weight on output =). Thelow welfare weight is selected to
yield roughly a path of disinflation of about the rate during l98l—84, (in
particular, it produces a recession in the early stage of disinflation with a
GNP gapof 8.5 percent).
Theintertemporal utility function is maximized using dynamic programming
techniques, under the alternative utility assumptions. The policy controls are
specifiedin three alternative ways. In Case I, the optimal policy mixofM and
G is selected to minimize U. In Case II, the policy path is restricted to
choices of monetary policy alone, with government spending fixed at a baseline
level. These two cases allow us to examine the advantages of using two policy—Ti—
instruments rather than one instrument alone. In a closed economy, Cases I and
II would yield almost identical results (in Tobin's "funnel" theory, there would
be no advantage, in terms of the output—inflation tradeoff, to having both
instruments). In Case III, both M and G vary, but the policy authority is
obliged to maintain that a policy mix that keeps the real exchange rate
constant. This alternative is implemented making Gt the policyinstrument,
fixing the real real exchange rate, and making Mt adjustendogenously to the
level consistent with the exchange rate target. In comparing Cases III andI,
we find the gains that can be achieved through manipulation of the real exchange
rate.
Table 11 shows the optimal policy paths for disinflation for backward—
looking wage behavior and for a variety of utility functions and policy options.
The results are striking. In Case I, where both M and G are freely employed,
the optimal path is to use expansionary G and contractionary M. In allcases,
the three—year sacrifice ratio is lower given this policy mix than with M alone,
and much lower than with a constant real exchange rate policy. However, in all
cases, the infinite—horizon sacrifice ratio is higher with the Mundell mix
policy than with M alone, or with a constant real exchange rate. This latter
effect results from the fact that in all cases the long—run real exchange rate
is more depreciated in Case I. Since the Mundell mix causes a sharp initial
appreciation, and an accumulation of foreign debt, it also involves a greater
long—run depreciation.2T
Inall examples, the optimal policy is an early recession and a gradual
recovery. In Case I, the recession is always brought about by a fall in M and aTable 11: Optimal Policy Paths for Disinflation
(with alternative weights on output in utility)
Year Sacrifice




Case I. Flexible Exchange Rate 3.147 5.20
Fiscal Policy (D/GNP) 5.7 3.7 3.1
Monetary Policy (Growth Ml) 0.6 1.3 3.5
Output Gap -.8.5 —7.0 —5.8
Inflation 7.5 14.7 3.9
Real Exchange Rate% 27.1 18.7 15.5
Case II. M Alone
Fiscal Policy 0 0 0
Monetary Policy 2.0 2.3 14.0
Output Gap —9.5 —7.5 —6.1
Inflation 8.5 5.1 4.1 3.93 5.00
Exchange Rate 15.1 10.7 8.5
Case III. Fixed Real Exchange Rate 14.55 14.97
Fiscal Policy —6.1 —5.1 —14.1
Monetary Policy 3.6 14.3 5.1
Output Gap —9.8 —7.8 -6.3
Inflation 9.8 5.9 14.7-
Real Exchange Rate 0 0 0
MEDIUM OUTPUT WEIGHT
Case I. Flexible Exchange Rate 3.12 5.30
Fiscal Policy 5.9 14.5 14.1
Monetary Policy 1.8 2.3 14.0
Output Gap —5.9 —5.2 —14.6
Inflation 7.5 5.6 14.9
Real Exchange Rate 26.8 20.0 17.5
Case II. M Alone
Fiscal Policy 0 0 0
Monetary Policy 3.1 3.6 14.9
Output Gap —6.8 —5.8 —5.1 3.88 5.00
Inflation 8.8 6.3 5.14
Exchange Rate 12.1 9.1 7.7
Case III. Fixed Real Exchange Rate 14.61 4.97
Fiscal Policy —14.14 —14.0 —3.14
Monetary Policy 14.1 5.2 5.9
Output Gap —7.1 —6.0 —5.2
Inflation 9.8 7.0 6.0
Real Exchange Rate 0 0 0
(Table continued on next page)Table 11 (cont'd.)
HIGH OUTPUT WEIGHT
Case I. Flexible Exchange Rate 2.65 5.)40
Fiscal Policy 6.0 5.2 1.8
Monetary Policy 2.8 2.9
Output Gap _)4•Q —3.6 _3.1
Inflation T.6 5.9
Real Exchange Rate 26.5 21.0 19.0
Case II. M Alone
Fiscal Policy 0 0 0
Monetary Policy 3.9 14.8 5.9
Output Gap _14.7J4 —3.8 3.83 5.00
Inflation 9.1 T.14 6.7
Exchange Rate 9.1 7.2 6.14
Case III. Fixed Real Exchange Rate 14.67 14.97
Fiscal Policy —3.0 —2.8 —2.5
Monetary Policy 14.6 5.9 6.8
Output Gap —14.8 —14.3 —3.9
Inflation 9.9 8.0 7.2
Real Exchange Rate 0 0 0—72—
risein G. The case with the low weight on output is closest to the U.S.
experience. Note that the deficit initially rises to 5.7' percent of GNP, and
the current account deficit is l.4 percent of GNP. The exchange rate appre-
ciates by 27' percent on impact, and then depreciates steadily over time, to a
new long—run equilibrium level percent below the initial baseline. As the uti—
lity weight on output increases, the optimal amount of fiscal expansion also
grows. Note that in the "high" case the initial deficit is 6.0 percent of GNP.
The Mundell mix is attractive because it allows for a quick disinflation at
low output cost (i.e., a low sacrifice ratio), even though it raises the
sacrifice ratio in the long run. It should be stressed why such a tradeoff is
desirable in the model, and therefore why the analysis is somewhat limited in
scope. The desirability of exploiting the short—run benefits of appreciation
result from: (1) quadratic costs of inflation (or at least rising marginal costs
of inflation); and (2) the implicit assumption that the indirect costs of the
policy mix (including budget deficits and current account deficits) are small
when nasured at a zero policy—change baseline. In other words, as in the static
model of the previous section, the econo]ir must have nore of an "inflation
problem"than a "budget deficit problem" or "current account problem" onthe
baseline.28Because of quadratic costs of inflation,it paysto reduce inflation
quickly; because of small welfare costs on the margin of budget deficits and
current account deficits, itisworth pursuing the Mundell mixforthe sakeof
inflation control.
The results really focus then, ontheoutput—inflation tradeoff, without
seriously trying to measure the welfarecosts of running large budget deficits—13—
orlarge current account deficits. Some critics of the mixhaveargued that the
policy mix has imposed large costs by restricting investment expenditure, though
Bosworth's analysis in this volume calls that view into question. Others have
worried about the political and economic ramifications of a large external U.S.
indebtedness. Still others have asserted that for given aggregate output
levels,there are n.jorcosts to a building of the non—tradeables sectors at the
expenseoftradeables, particularly since that buildup will likely have to be
reversed over time. Such assertions are plausible, but so far unquantified. I
have included a weight for them by weighing the welfare costs of budget deficits
and current account deficits in the social welfare function. To the extent that
they are to be more highly credited, the result would be to further weaken the
case for the strong—dollar policymix.In anyevent,all of the optimal policy-
paths call for a steady real depreciation after the initial appreciation.
However much the Mundell mix ispursued, it mustbe reversed over time.
Finally, I re—iterate a point nntioned several times before. The welfare
discussion is based entirely on a national welfare function, taking as given the
actions abroad. A global analysis of global disinflation would likely argue
against the attempt of any particular country- to engineer a large currency
appreciation.
Conclusions and Problems Ahead
Without the strong dollar in recent years, the U.S. would either have much
higher inflation, or still be languishing with double—digit unempoloyment as in
Europe. But since the past is past, the future does indeed look somewhat—T 14_
bleaker since the U.S. economy has already enjoyed the benefits of the strong
dollar, and now faces the higher inflation built into the process of unwinding
the dollar. As long as the depreciation is gradual, the actual inflation rate
does not have to rise as the dollar falls, as long as domestic price inflation
continues to fall, which is likely if there is continued (and declining) slack
in the economy. As shown in Case (1) above, with "low" output weight, the
unwinding of the dollar takes place in the context of steady declines in
inflation and a steady rise of output to full employment.
The risks from the current situation come either from the possibility of a
sharp drop in the dollar, or a real appreciatoin that is sustained for too long.
Note that the optimal policy packages involve high but steadily falling budget
deficits, and certainly not a path of continuing high and rising deficits, as
now appears possible in the United States. What happens, in fact, if the
Mundell mix gets stuck, and the deficits remain inappropriately high? To
investigate this case, the nde1 is simulated for a permanent exogenous path of
deficits of 5 percent of GNP, with optimum monetary policy that takes the
deficit path as given. The major effect of this undesirable fiscal policy is a
sustainedpath of current account deficits, and a large long—term decline in
private absorption. The economy experiences an enormous increase in external
indebtedness, and real consumption is squeezed in the long runtomake room for
the net exports needed for debt servicing.
Afinal case to consider is the implication of a shift in portfolio
preferencesagainst the dollar, starting from a situation of large real
appreciation. Many analysts, such as Marris, believe that when the dollarTable 12: Effects of a Shift in Portfolio Preferences
Away from $U.S.
(28.5 percent depreciation on impact)
1985 1986 1987 1988
(a) No Portfolio Shift
(baseline adjustment path)
Real Exchange Rate 18.0 14.1 12.1 10.4
Output Gap -4.8 -4.0 -3.4 -2.8
Inflation level 3.3 2.6 2.2 1.8
(b) A Portfolio Shift, with
Policies Kept as in (a)
Real Exchange Rate —9.5 4.3 5.7 5.8
Output Gap 0.5 -7.5 —5.5 —6.3
Inflation level 5.0 6.5 3.6 2.9
(c) A Portfolio Shift, with
Optimal Policy Response
Real Exchange Rate 0.2 -1.5 -2.7 —3.6
Output Gap —6.1 -5.0 —4.1 —3.4
Inflation level 4.9 3.6 2.0 2.4—75—
beginsto depreciate the "luster" on the currency will diminish and a flight
from dollars will ensure. What is the appropriate response of policy in that
case, given that adjustments to such a shock will inevitably be painful.
To study this case, we suppose that inherited inflation is 5%atthe time
of the portfolio shift, and that the preceding period's GNPgap was 5percent.
An exogenous and permanent portfolio shift in ROECD occurs that for unchanged
U.S.policy settings would result ina 28.5 percent depreciation of the dollar
(this is of course a very sizeable shock!). Optimal nnetary and fiscal
policiesare then applied in response to this shock. The results are shown in
Table 12, where we compare output and inflation in three cases: (1) no portfolio
shift; (b) a portfolio shift but no policy response; and (c) a portfolio shift,
with optimal policy response. The utility function settings are for the case of
low weight on output.
By itself, the portfolio shift causes a rise in output in the first year
and sharp increase in inflation. In principal the direction of effect of a
portfolio shift on output is ambiguous. When the portfolio shift occurs, U.S.
interest rates rise and the real exchange rate depreciates. The first effect
tends to reduce output, while the latter tends to raise output. In the ndel as
specified, the exchange rate effect dominates the interest rate effect (this is
true of most large—scale econometric models as well). However, by year 2 the
effect turns negative. Policyinakers are forced to tighten sharply in the face
of the portfolio shift. The economy is pushed into a mild recession, with the
outputgap about1 percent higher, and inflation 1 percent higher, for four
years. Thus, even with an optimal response to the portfolio shift, the net
result is a spurt in inflation and a mild recession.—76—
Appendix:Commodity Prices and the Exchange Rate
We divide the world into the U.S., the rest of the OECD (hereafter ROECD),
and the less developed countries (hereafter LDC), including the non—oil ODCs and
OPEC. The exchange rate measures the ECU/$ rate, where the "ECU" is the
weighted average currency of the ROECD. We assume that LDC pegs its currency to
maintain a constant real exchange rate vis—a—vis the total OECD area, with the
U.S.receivinga weightand the ROECD (l—) in the LDCcurrencybasket.
Letting p, p0 and be the fixed (log) output prices in local currencies in the
three areas, we assume:
(A.1) eL =L +(i—a)(p0—e)1
Furthermore, by the assumption of competitive world trade in R, we mayspecify-
the local currency price of R is:
(A.2) r in the U.S.
+ein the ROECD
+eLin the ROW
Now, a useful model makes supply of R in each country an increasing
functionof the local relative price of R. Assuming a constant supply
elasticity
(A.3) R = )C—TT—
R0=(pRE/PO)C in ROECD
RL = inLDC
Demand for R is written as a negative function of the relative price of R, and





Equilibrium requires the world supply R (= + + RT)equalworld demand
( + +):
(A.5)RW =
Theconceptual experiment asks how a percentage change in E affects the
dollar price of comndity B, holding fixed the output prices P and P°. To
solve this problem, we logarithmically differentiate (A.3) and (A.), and note






where 0' and 00 are the shares of the U.S. and ROECD in supplyofRW (and 0 are
analogously defined) at the initial equilibrium.Remember, finally, that br
assumption de1 =L/EL=ade.The second equality follows fromA.l.After a





Notethat r changes in proportion to a weighted average of changes in p and
(p0—e), andalsoin response to changes (weighted) in world income yW• y is the weight
attached to U.S prices and (1.-i) is the corresponding weight for ROECD prices.
According to (A.7), the effect of an exchange rate change on p' is given
by dp7de =(1—y).It is easy to compute dp"/de a number of special cases.
If the U.S. is tsmall" in the world, in the sense that 0" =0
=a0, then
dp'7de =—1.This is the standard case that for a sil1 country, an exchange
appreciation lowers traded good prices one—for—one. If the U.S. is dominant in
the OECD, with a =1and 0U == 1,then dp'7de =0.Inthis case, an
exchange depreciation would have no effect on dollar commodity prices. Third,—79—
ifthe U.S. share of the OECD production and consumption of R are equal,
and are in turn equal to a (the weight of the U.S. in the LDC's exchange
r
basket), then dp /de =1—a.The larger is the U.S. weight, the smaller
is the exchange rate effect on dollar commodity prices.—80—
Footnotes
1.Robert A. Mundell, "The Dollar and the Policy Mix: 1971," Essays in
International Finance, No. 85,May1971. Mundell argued that "Etihe correct
policy mixisbased on fiscal ease to get more production out of the economy-, in
combination with monetary restraint to stop inflation." (p. 24. Emphasis in original)
2.To quote Mundell:"Monetarypolicy has its comparative advantage in
controlling inflation and the balance of payments, and should be reserved for
that purpose. Financial instruments [i.e. money] should be allocated to
cial targets; real instniments [i.e. fiscal policy] to real targets." (p. 17.
Emphasis in original. Brackets my own.)
3.Robert A. Mundell, "The Appropriate Use of Monetary and Fiscal Policy for
Internal and External Stability," IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 9(March1962).
)4.Throughoutthe paper the weighted—average exchangerate is the MERMindex
of effective exchange rates, as calculated by the IMP.
5.Forexample, even in a closed economy, the high interest rate effects of
the Mundellian mix could cause primary commodity prices to fall if inventories
arede—stocked in response to the interest rates. Such a decline in inventories
would provide a temporary, favorable "supply shock" to the economy, which could
feed throughtolower prices and wages.
6.See,for example, R. Dornbusch and S. Fischer, "Exchange Rates and the
Current Account," American EconomicReview, 70:960—71, 1980; and J.Sachs and C.
Wyplosz, "Real Exchange Rate Effects of Fiscal Policy," T'IBER Working Paper No.
1255, January 198)4.
7.See Stanley Fischer, "Real Balances, the Exchange Rate, and Indexation:
Real Variables in Disinflation," NBER Discussion Paper No. l197, November l984.
8.Okun used a multiplier of 3 to get the GNP gapfromthe unemployment rate.
Gordon'sequationyields a multiplier of about 2.
9.SeePeter looper and Barbara R. Lowrey, "Impact of the Dollar Depreciation
ontheU.S. Price Level:An Analytical Survey of Empirical Estimates," Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April 1979.
10. Rudiger Donthusch and Stanley Fischer, "The Open Economy: Implications for
Monetary and Fiscal Policy," NBER WorkingPaper No. 1)422, August 198)4.
11.See, for example, Dean A. DeRosa and Morris Goldstein, "Import Discipline
in the U.S. Manufacturing Sector," IMPStaffPapers, Vol. 28, No. 3, September
1981.—81—
onthe 1983 inflation ratewillbe the sum of the importpriceeffects of 1981,
1982, and 1983.
13. The following variables areusedin the regression:
c $U.S.priceof Saudi crude petroleum exports
pf weighted average of Economist commodity indexes for primary food
(weight 0.95) and beverages (weight 0.05)
weighted average of Economist commodity indexes for primary non—food
agriculture (weight )andfor primary metals (weight )
m implicit price deflator for U.S. consumer good imports, NIPA
w hourly earnings index for non—supervisory workers, non—farm econoiry
(dependent variable) personal consumption deflator, NIPA
t =1,60:1;2=G0:2;etc.
114.The unit constraint is imposed in a manner suggested by Robert Gordon.
Using the lag distribution from the unconstrained estimation, a weighted average
wagevariable is created, equal tow =(EX.wt wherethe X. are the
PDLweights on w. Then, the regression is re—estimated by subtractingfrom
theleft—hand and remaining right—hand side variables.
15.Theseare reported in technical appendixes on "non—oil primary commodity
price developmentsand prospects" of the World Economic Outlook, for May 19814,
April 198)4, and April 1985.
16. IMF World Economic Outlook, April 1985, p. 138.
17. J. Longmire and A. Morey, "Strong Dollar Dampers Demand for U.S. Farm
Exports," U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Foreign
Agricultural Economic Report Number 193, December 1983.
18.The data refer to the lEA Countries.Seethe Monthly Energy Review, Energy
Information Administration, Washington, D.C., January 19814, pp. 101—103.
19. The model consistsof the c equation, the wage change equation, and the
inputprice equations.
20.Icommit the minor sin of setting (1/E)e =ifEe,where "e" signifies
expectations. This is for expositional ease, and is exactly correct only if the
expectationsare heldwith subjective certainty.
21.Fischer, "Real Balances, the Exchange Rate, and Indexation", op.cit.
22. William Buiter and Marcus Miller, "Real Exchange Rate Overshooting and the
Output Cost of Bringing Down Inflation," European Economic Review, 18, 1 (1982),
pp.85—123.—82—



















Combiningthe firsttwoequations, we see also that =
2b.J. Sachs and W. Mckibbin, "Macroeconomic Policies in OECD and LDC External
Adjustment,'t NEERDiscussionPaper No. l534, January1985.
25. Sachs and Mckibbin, op.cit.
26. Oudix and Sachs, "International Policy Coordination in Dynamic
Macroeconomic Models," in W. Buiter and R. Marston (eds.), International
Economic Policy Coordination, Cambridge University Press, for the NBER and CEPR.
27. Compare this result with our earlier illustration of the Buiter—Miller
model, in which the long—run sacrifice ratio is fixed. In that case we ruled
out long—run changes in the real exchange rate.
28. As we have seen, this statement can be given precise technical content for
a specific optmization problem.